Has the dollar's hegemony come to an end?
After President Nixon formalised the end of the Bretton Woods Agreements, the dollar went from being a currency that based its value on the existence of a gold counterpart to a currency with no tangible value, known as fiat money. 11Onze agent Xavi Viñolas examines the process of de-dollarisation.
This new monetary framework established in the Bretton Woods Agreements was the basis for the creation of the petrodollar system, thus establishing the dollar as the de facto oil currency, giving the United States a privileged position, which it has often abused, a fact that has provoked the reaction of some countries.
In the video below, Xavi Viñolas explains why the trend to decouple the world economy from the hegemony of the dollar, known as the process of de-dollarisation, is increasingly being adopted by more and more countries, and the reasons behind it.
Un altre banc dels Estats Units ha fet fallida, els bancs centrals ofereixen línies de crèdit d’urgència i cauen les accions de les entitats financeres. Els governs i les agències reguladores ens asseguren que no hem de patir pels nostres diners i l’estabilitat del sector bancari. Però ens en podem refiar? Què diuen a porta tancada?
La Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) és una agència federal dels Estats Units que es va crear el 1933 a conseqüència de la Gran Depressió amb l’objectiu de protegir els dipòsits bancaris i evitar la fallida en massa dels bancs. Actualment, la FDIC assegura fins a 250.000 dòlars per compte per titular en cas que el banc on estan dipositats els diners faci fallida.
Dins d’aquesta agència federal hi trobem el Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee (SRAC), un comitè assessor establert el 2011 per la FDIC, com a part de la Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, una llei que va ser aprovada com a resposta a la crisi financera del 2008 i que va introduir una sèrie de mesures per regular el sector financer i prevenir futurs col·lapses del sistema.
El SRAC ajuda en la gestió de possibles fallides dels bancs més grans del país i està format per experts del sector financer que assessoren la FDIC a l’hora de desenvolupar plans d’actuació en cas que hi hagi un col·lapse bancari a gran escala. El comitè està format per membres de diferents sectors de l’economia, incloent-hi representants dels reguladors financers, els bancs, les assegurances, els fons d’inversió i altres entitats del sector financer.
Els interessos de la banca tenen prioritat
Els integrants del SRAC es reuneixen periòdicament per parlamentar i fer recomanacions a la FDIC sobre com abordar els problemes que pugui estar patint una entitat financera. D’aquesta manera ofereixen assessorament en temes com la planificació de la resolució, la identificació dels actius i passius de l’entitat, la comunicació amb els creditors i altres aspectes relacionats que contribueixin a assegurar l’estabilitat de l’entitat i de l’ecosistema bancari. Així mateix, estableixen un pla d’acció davant d’una possible crisi bancària, acordant quina informació se li ha de donar a la població per tal d’evitar un col·lapse del sistema.
Algunes d’aquestes reunions estan obertes al públic a través d’un ‘webcast’ i d’altres es fan en privat, a porta tancada. Un dels objectius de l’última reunió oberta que va tenir lloc el passat mes de novembre sembla ser evitar que, davant d’una crisi bancària, el pànic generalitzat porti a la retirada massiva de dipòsits per part de la ciutadania preocupada pels seus diners. Cal tenir en compte que els diners que tenim al banc estan regits per un sistema de reserva fraccionària, segons el qual només una petita part dels dipòsits, un 1% en el cas de l’eurozona, han d’estar disponibles per a la seva retirada.
En aquest context, hem de recordar que per evitar un col·lapse del sistema financer davant d’una crisi bancària, la primera opció és rescatar a certes entitats mitjançant els diners dels contribuents, és a dir, un rescat extern. Però també hi ha una segona opció que es coneix com un rescat intern, segons el qual els accionistes, els titulars de bons i els clients amb dipòsits no assegurats – quantitats superiors a 100.000 euros en el cas de la UE – es fan càrrec del rescat. Com apunta el comitè, avui en dia el deute bancari no està sistemàticament protegit, i si se’ns en va de les mans, tot el sistema es col·lapsa.
Això és el que va passar a Xipre durant la crisi financera de 2008, quan el Govern, seguint les instruccions de la Troika (Unió Europea, BCE i FMI), va confiscar els dipòsits no assegurats de la ciutadania per liquidar i reestructurar bancs, causant el ‘corralito’ xipriota. D’aquí ve la importància que el SRAC dona a limitar la comunicació amb el públic general, no fos cas que la gent volgués retirar els seus diners d’aquestes entitats bancàries abans que desapareguin per complet. Una informació privilegiada, que segons el comitè, s’ha de reservar per a una minoria selecta, presumiblement ells mateixos o gent afí, que sí que ha d’estar al corrent de la magnitud de la tragèdia.
Les males notícies es donen un divendres al vespre
L’internet i la cobertura de notícies les 24 hores no ha fet desaparèixer la pràctica habitual en relacions públiques de llançar els comunicats amb informació negativa els divendres per evitar una gran cobertura mediàtica. Almenys això pensa el panell del comitè quan apunta que en preparar un comunicat detallant les dures mesures que s’aplicarien enfront d’una crisi bancària és preferible donar la informació “un divendres, o millor encara, un divendres al vespre, de manera que la gent tingui temps de rebre, entendre i de concloure que sí, que poden funcionar”.
Potser el més sorprenent, o no, són les declaracions de Gary Cohn, expresident i exdirector d’operacions de Goldman Sachs, quan explica que “cal pensar en les conseqüències no desitjades de dir segons què a un públic que té més fe i confiança en el sistema bancari que la gent que estem en aquesta sala (rialles dels membres assistents) i que volem que segueixin tenint plena fe i confiança en el sistema bancari”.
Algú podria pensar que els bancs i les agències reguladores estan admetent que s’acosta un col·lapse, però que tenen poc interès en què la ciutadania ho sàpiga perquè volen utilitzar els dipòsits de la gent per a rescatar aquests bancs. Potser ens hauria de servir d’avís el que va passar durant la crisi del 2008, o amb la fallida del Silicon Valley Bank el març d’aquest any, quan només una minoria selecta que estava informada de la gravetat de la situació va poder treure els seus diners a temps, però com va dir Hegel, “L’única cosa que aprenem de la història és que no aprenem de la història”.
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Unemployment rises slightly in Catalonia in July, despite the fact that the employment record has been maintained. But can we trust the reliability of the official data? Are there inactive workers who should be counted as unemployed?
Catalonia has registered an upturn in unemployment after five consecutive months of a downward trend. According to data published by the Ministry of Labour, during July, the Catalan labour market added 1,612 more unemployed people (+0.49%) than in June. Despite this slight increase in unemployment, it remains the lowest unemployment figure since the 2008 crisis.
Currently, there are a total of 331,356 unemployed people, but in the last year, the total number of unemployed has been reduced by 10,035 people, 2.94% less. Compared to 2022, there are 103,185 more contracts, which is equivalent to a 2.8% increase. In total, there are 3.75 million workers in Catalonia and an unemployment rate of 8.44%.
The unemployment figures for Spain as a whole also reflect the best figures for 15 years. The Spanish economy continues to create jobs and reduce unemployment for the fifth consecutive month, although the pace slowed in July to below the historical average. The active population increases to 23.8 million people and the number of employed exceeds 21 million, another record high.
Unemployment stood at 11.6%, a fall of 11.7 points, after 365,300 people found work in the second quarter of the year, adding 595,614 people to Social Security since January. On the other hand, the number of unemployed registered at the offices of the public employment services fell by 10,968 people in July, -0.41% compared with the previous month, to a total of 2.68 million.
Inactive workers who are not registered as unemployed
In March 2022, the latest labour reform came into force, one of the main objectives of which was to change the production model, moving from temporary to permanent contracts in order to reduce temporary employment and precariousness. Therefore, work and service contracts disappeared, while the possibility of temporary contracts was restricted to very specific situations that cannot exceed 90 days worked per year.
In exchange, it was proposed that companies should use fixed-term contracts so that people doing seasonal work would not have to worry about whether their contract would be renewed after a period of inactivity and would have the same rights as workers with a permanent contract.
Despite the benefits for employees that this type of contract brings, it has the counterpart that workers who were previously considered unemployed are no longer counted as unemployed. In other words, when an employee with a fixed-term contract enters a period of inactivity, he or she receives unemployment benefits, but is not counted as unemployed, but is considered a “jobseeker with an employment relationship”.
This is a significant number of people who, in Catalonia alone, last year accounted for 5.7% of all workers affiliated with Social Security in Catalonia under this type of contract. If we take figures for the whole of Spain in December 2022 and January of this year, they were equivalent to 443,078 and 660,000 unaccounted jobseekers.
Obviously, the official data do not include the people who are looking for work but who are not registered with the SOC or the SEPE, either because they are self-employed, because they do not make any profit, or because they are part of the underground economy. Nor is it specified how many people work part-time, not because they want to, but because they cannot find another full-time job.
And it is true that these figures are difficult to account for, but more transparency in the data related to discontinuous permanent workers does not require any effort, but the simple will to reduce the divergence between the reality of the labour market and the official rhetoric, an unavoidable necessity if we really want to evaluate the effectiveness of employment policies.
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Els ‘forwards’ i els ‘swaps’ de divises generen futures obligacions de pagament que no apareixen en els balanços ni en les estadístiques oficials de deute. Segons el Banc de Pagaments Internacionals, aquest deute ocult ascendeix a 39 bilions de dòlars en el cas dels bancs i a 26 bilions en el de les entitats no bancàries amb seu fora dels Estats Units.
Els ‘forwards’ de divises són contractes vinculants que fixen el tipus de canvi per a la compra o venda d’una divisa en una data futura, mentre que els ‘swaps’ de divises són acords entre dues parts per intercanviar pagaments d’interessos de préstecs en dues divises diferents.
Els primers serveixen de cobertura davant la volatilitat del mercat canviari. Els segons solen utilitzar-se per aconseguir finançament en moneda estrangera amb un tipus d’interès més favorable que els dels crèdits que es poden obtenir en un mercat estranger. Però ni els uns ni els altres es reflecteixen en els balanços de les empreses ni en les estadístiques oficials de deute.
Creixement exponencial
El problema és que, com adverteix el Banc de Pagaments Internacionals (BIS per les seves sigles en anglès), a mitjan 2022 els bancs de fora dels Estats Units amb accés directe al crèdit de la Reserva Federal devien uns “39 bilions de dòlars” si sumem els seus ‘forwards’ i ‘swaps’ de divises. És més del doble del deute en dòlars que consta en els seus balanços i més de deu vegades el seu capital.
En el cas de les entitats no bancàries amb seu fora dels Estats Units, l’import ascendeix a “26 bilions de dòlars”, el doble del deute en dòlars que consta en els seus balanços i 9 bilions més del que devien l’any 2016.
El volum total d’aquest deute gairebé s’ha doblat respecte a l’any 2008. Els inversors han aprofitat la relaxació monetària i uns tipus d’interès ultrabaixos per a augmentar el seu palanquejament a la recerca de majors rendiments.
Fora del balanç
Aquest mercat de divises porta implícit un enorme endeutament en dòlars que queda ocult, ja que, a diferència d’altres derivats com els acords de recompra o ‘repos’, les obligacions de pagament dels ‘forwards’ i ‘swaps’ de divises es registren fora del balanç.
Les obligacions de pagament d’aquests derivats ascendeixen a quantitats astronòmiques. Considerant totes les divises, els imports pendents a la fi de juny de 2022 van assolir els 97 bilions de dòlars, 30 bilions més que l’any 2016 i pràcticament el mateix que el PIB mundial.
Només l’abril de 2022 el volum d’operacions amb aquesta mena de derivats es va acostar als 5 bilions de dòlars diaris, segons el BIS, dos terços de la facturació diària mundial de divises.
Protagonisme aclaparador del dòlar
Com a moneda vehicular, el dòlar es troba a un costat del 88% de les posicions vives, segons dades del BIS. I és que fins i tot un banc que vulgui fer un ‘swap’ entre dues divises diferents del dòlar, recorreria a aquesta moneda com a pas intermedi.
Com destaca el BIS, “gran part d’aquest deute és a molt curt termini”, per la qual cosa “les necessitats de refinançament resultants provoquen restriccions de finançament en dòlars”. De fet, gairebé quatre cinquenes parts dels imports pendents a la fi de juny de 2022 vencien en menys d’un any.
La falta d’informació directa sobre aquests derivats dificulta a les autoritats monetàries preveure la magnitud i la geografia de les necessitats de refinançament en dòlars. Com a conseqüència, resulta més complicat restablir el flux fluid de dòlars a curt termini en el sistema financer quan és necessari, especialment en temps de crisi i quan el dòlar ha experimentat una important revaloració.
Risc sistèmic?
Com adverteix el BIS, el palanquejament ocult i el desajustament de venciments en les carteres dels fons de pensions i les companyies d’assegurances “podrien plantejar un repte polític” per garantir el flux fluid de dòlars en la pròxima gran crisi. Cal no oblidar que la demanda de dòlars augmenta en moments d’incertesa en els mercats.
A més, donada l’enorme escala d’aquest deute, un volum rellevant d’impagaments podria tenir greus efectes sistèmics.
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Fractional-reserve banking is a system in which only a portion of deposits must be available for withdrawal. The remainder can be used for investment or lending to help expand the economy. It is currently the banking system used in most of the world’s economies.
Doubts about the solvency of Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse led their customers to withdraw their deposits en masse in March. None of them had sufficient reserves to cope with the flood of savers and businesses wanting to withdraw their money. The former eventually collapsed and the latter had to be taken over by UBS following a liquidity injection of millions of dollars by the Swiss central bank.
Banking systems in most countries oblige banks to keep a small part of their customers’ deposits in reserve to meet withdrawals, either in physical cash or in highly liquid instruments. The rest can be used for investments and loans that contribute to the growth of the economy by keeping money flowing. This is the basis of fractional reserve banking.
This type of banking makes possible the bank multiplier, which expands the money in circulation when, upon receiving a deposit, the bank holds only a small fraction in reserve and lends out the rest. In this way, two people hold the same money, the one who has made the deposit and the one who has received the loan. This is why the monetary base, i.e. real money, is lower than the monetary aggregates of the financial system.
Beyond its own reserves, if a bank needs additional liquidity to fund loans, liquidate deposits or meet other obligations, it can borrow money from other banks. Or, as a last resort, it can turn to the discount window of its country’s central bank, where it can obtain money at a higher interest rate.
The risk of banking panic
The problem with fractional reserve banking is the constant risk of insolvency in the face of a massive withdrawal of funds from an institution, especially given the process of deregulation that the sector has undergone since the 1980s. In a panic situation such as that experienced by customers of Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse, there is a risk that withdrawals will exceed the available reserves and the system’s capacity to inject sufficient liquidity.
Fractional reserve banking is considered to have its roots in the Middle Ages and was linked to the trade in precious metals. Goldsmiths began to use the gold deposited in their establishments to issue interest-bearing loans in the form of promissory notes, which were later used as a medium of exchange. The promissory notes issued eventually exceeded the amount of physical gold in their custody.
From the 17th century onwards, banks issuing paper money became widespread. By the 19th century, thousands of banks were already doing so. The crisis caused by the bankruptcy of many of them led to the creation of central banks, which had to back the currency they issued exclusively.
The situation in the Eurozone
At present, credit institutions in the euro area are obliged to hold at least the equivalent of 1% of specific liabilities, mainly customer deposits, with their national central bank. This is currently equivalent to around 165 billion euros, according to data from the European Central Bank (ECB). As the Banco de España indicates, this is “a monetary policy instrument that affects the structural liquidity needs of the market and allows short-term interest rates to be stabilised”.
These minimum reserve requirements are fixed for a period of six to seven weeks, known as the “maintenance period”. The amount of funds to be set aside is calculated on the basis of the institution’s balance sheet before the maintenance period begins.
At the end of each maintenance period, the euro area national central banks pay interest to private institutions on these minimum reserves. This remuneration has historically been linked to the main refinancing operations (MRO) rate, but from the end of 2022, the minimum reserves are remunerated at the deposit facility rate. This change better aligns the interest paid on reserve requirements with prevailing money market rates.
The vulnerability of US banks
In March 2020, the Federal Reserve reduced reserve requirements for all depository institutions to zero. Instead, banks are now paid a specific interest rate on their reserve balance to encourage reserve maintenance.
This measure, aimed at injecting liquidity into the US economy during the pandemic, has increased risk in the US banking system, as seen in the case of Silicon Valley Bank.
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Les noves directrius de la Unió Europea deixen enrere la relaxació fiscal aprovada durant la pandèmia i fan ressorgir el fantasma de les polítiques d’austeritat.
El març del 2020 la Unió Europea va suspendre temporalment les regles fiscals recollides en el Pacte d’Estabilitat i Creixement, perquè els països poguessin augmentar la seva despesa pública per fer front a l’impacte de la pandèmia. Això va suposar congelar els límits del 3% i del 60% del PIB per al dèficit i el deute, respectivament.
La Comissió Europea ha decidit allargar la suspensió d’aquestes regles fiscals fins a finals del 2023 a causa de l’impacte del conflicte a Ucraïna: “La pròrroga de la clàusula general de fuita fins a 2023 reconeix l’alta incertesa i grans riscos en una situació en la qual l’estat de l’economia europea no s’ha normalitzat”, explicava el comissari europeu d’assumptes econòmics, Paolo Gentiloni.
Tanmateix, vol que es tornin a reactivar a partir del 2024 i ja té redactades les noves normes fiscals, incorporant alguns elements d’un nou marc en el qual la Comissió Europea està treballant i que està previst que entri en vigor el 2025.
Brussel·les donarà més marge als estats
La UE relaxa les regles del joc per facilitar que els estats puguin quadrar els seus comptes evitant les retallades indiscriminades a conseqüència de les agressives polítiques d’austeritat adoptades després de la crisi de 2008, que van comportar misèria per la població i així com provocar una ruptura entre els països endeutats del sud i els seus socis del nord.
Això no obstant, Brussel·les ha tingut en compte les sensibilitats de països com Alemanya que volen assegurar el compliment de les regles i delimitar clarament els límits de dèficit. En aquest sentit, inclourà sancions en cas d’incompliments i proposa una reducció anual del 0,5% del deute públic pels estats que superin el límit acordat.
De la mateixa manera, la Comissió és cura en salut i passa la responsabilitat d’assumir els compromisos fiscals als Estats, que hauran de presentar els seus plans a quatre anys vista i responsabilitzar-se de futures retallades sense poder assenyalar a Brussel·les. “Les noves propostes donen més flexibilitat als Estats membres per dissenyar les seves trajectòries fiscals, però, com a contrapartida, hauran de rendir comptes de manera més creïble”, apuntava Gentiloni.
Sindicats europeus critiquen la proposta
La Confederació Europea de Sindicats (ETUC, per les seves sigles en anglès) argumenta que aquestes mesures significaran: “més pobresa, menys feina i salaris més baixos”, alertava Esther Lynch, secretaria general de l’ETUC. L’organització avisa que 10 estats membres, entre ells Espanya, tenen un dèficit superior al 3%, i hauran d’adoptar retallades de despeses l’any vinent, corrent el risc d’obrir el camí de retorn a l’austeritat.
L’organisme ha calculat que la proposta legislativa de Brussel·les obligaria als Estats membres amb un dèficit superior al límit del 3% a retallar la despesa pública en 45.000 milions d’euros durant el 2024 o a apujar els impostos en una mateixa quantitat. A més, afirma que això provocaria que aquests estats no puguin complir amb els objectius de la UE per a la inversió en l’economia verda i digital.
En aquest context, l’organització demana que es mantinguin els fons europeus per la recuperació, introduïts durant la pandèmia com a mecanisme de solidaritat per garantir la igualtat de condicions en l’àmbit de les inversions entre els Estats membres. De la mateixa manera, proposen “un règim just de fiscalitat empresarial que pugui finançar un nivell mínim d’inversions estatals en els pressupostos nacionals”, evitant la concessió de fons públics a empreses que practiquen l’evasió fiscal.
La desconfiança dels sindicats i d’alguns països sobre les decisions l’Executiu europeu no són noves, tot i que plenament justificades tenint en compte les actuacions anteriors davant de les crisis de deute. Queda per veure com serà l’aplicació de les noves regles fiscals, però de moment, Brussel·les ja ha demanat a Espanya que limiti els seus plans de despesa pública pel 2024 a fi de cenyir-se als pròxims ajustos fiscals.
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The economy has been one of the main protagonists in the relationship between Catalonia and Spain. 11Onze agent Oriol Garcia Farré compiles nine of these key moments in our history. They may not be the best known, but they are undoubtedly the ones that have marked a before and after. One after the other, they offer a chronology of encounters and misunderstandings.
“As long as Spain does not understand the Catalan issue,
Spain will be subjected to the same woes of the past”.
Américo Castro, 1924
1479. The construction of a dynastic state
After the Castilian Civil War, the two largest kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula (Castile and Catalan Confederation) together created a new political entity known as the Hispanic Monarchy. This dynastic state was formed from the union of just two elements: the army and foreign policy. The other elements that make up a modern state, such as borders, currencies, laws, and institutions, remained completely separate. Thus, with regard to the configuration and distribution of power, it should be borne in mind that, while Castile was organised according to the authority of the queen (Isabella), always above the nobility and the church, the Crown of Aragon was organised around the Constitució de l’Observança, which obliged the king (Ferran) to govern and make agreements in accordance with the laws of the Principality. This is the first difference in the system of political and economic organisation between Spain and Catalonia.
1556. The drift of history
With the death of the Castilian queen (Isabella), the peninsular dynastic state was at the point of dissolving. After family vicissitudes, the throne was eventually occupied by the grandson, due to the incapacity of the daughter (Juana) and the death of the son-in-law (Felipe). The dynastic union between the two kingdoms was thus definitively confirmed in the persons of Carlos (the future emperor) and his successors. For years, Emperor Charles sought to consolidate the idea of a universal monarchy that would be polyglot and open to the entire territory of the Habsburg Empire. The Emperor’s policy was aimed at changing the course of European history. It was of no use for him to believe that it was possible for the rights of cities and regions to coexist with the imperial structure, since the idea of the nation-state was gaining ground, largely as a result of the Reformation. Nor did it ever manage to create the necessary complicity between Castilians and Catalans to forge a common country.
1585. The perversity of the system
In the autumn of 1585, King Felipe II of Castile presided over the celebration of the General Courts of the Catalan Confederation in Monzón. Following the tradition established by his father (Carlos), Felipe II thus recognised the duality of power in the peninsular territory formed by the crowns of Castile and Catalonia Confederation. The parliamentary system always involves tensions – because that’s intrinsic to debating – but it seemed that an agreement would be reached. The problem arose when royal officials tried to blatantly boycott the Cortes‘ resolutions. And it is even more perverse when the Monarchy – unilaterally – decides to manipulate and rewrite the agreements made by the Catalan Cortes to favour its interests. Among the most important alterations, which affected the entire Crown of Aragon, were those relating to the control of trade, the increase in spending by the Royal Court in Catalan territory, and the dilution of the control that the Diputació del General (the Generalitat) could have over the Holy Office (the Inquisition), the repressive arm of the monarchy.
1626. Towards a single centralised unit
In March 1626, Barcelona received the King of Castile, Felipe IV, who had come to the city to swear the Catalan Constitutions. The reason was none other than to unravel the ambitious plan of the king’s minister, the Count-Duke of Olivares. The project, known as the “Unión de Armas”, called for each kingdom that formed part of Castile – that is, mainly the Catalan Confederation – to contribute a certain amount of money and soldiers. But what the Castilian oligarchies did not realise was that if Felipe IV swore to the Catalan Constitutions, he was automatically granted the title of count of Barcelona, which obliged him to oversee their resources. The Catalans were, therefore, more interested in having their proposals for new Catalan Constitutions approved, and their grievances addressed, than in engaging in absurd wars. Curiously, two decades later, the northern Catalan territory would be dishonestly torn away from the main body. And it would not be until forty years later that Castile would officially notify the Generalitat of the loss of the northern Catalan territory.
1760. The rules of the game change
For several decades, a new family of French origin had held the throne of Castile, the Borbones. The open dispute over that ascension had been left behind, to the point that it had had to be settled on the battlefield. Four decades after the Nueva Planta Decree, King Carlos III convened the Cortes Generales in Madrid. In that new political paradigm that emerged from the battlefield, the representatives of the former territories of the Catalan Confederation -formed by Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia and Mallorca- jointly presented a memorial containing a frontal critique of the Borbonic system in force. To put it very simply, the document, known as the “Memorial de greuges”, argued that the new state had to safeguard territorial plurality and move away from centralist and unifying structures.
1810. The construction of a new political reality
In the context of a European war, more than 240 deputies from all over the territory arrived in Cadiz convinced that they were going to make history, to write a Constitution. King Carlos IV of Spain had been deposed as an absolutist, after the French occupation of the peninsular territory. The Cortes of Cádiz established that power resided in the citizens as a whole, represented by the Cortes. But Cadiz was also – for the first time – a real opportunity for Catalan politicians to be invited to participate actively in the new Spanish political system that was being created. In that revolutionary context, the Catalan delegation openly defended the proposal to modernise Spain in accordance with the Austrian project that had been liquidated less than a century before. Therefore, economic and social development had to be based on the industrialisation of the territories. But the Treaty of Valençay restored Fernando VII to the throne as an absolute monarch and frustrated all the modern ideas that had emerged from the Cortes de Cádiz and its revolutionary constitution, which had shaken Spain.
1870. History always gives a second chance
That summer of 1870 in Paris, María Isabel Luisa de Borbón y Borbón-Dos Sicilias, Queen of Spain, abdicated. This renunciation of power – like Emperor Carlos – was the consequence of an intense political debate about how Spain’s modernity was to be articulated. The dispute between Carlists and Liberals had been settled on the battlefields for the past three decades. But during the following decades the impasse would continue. Spain had entered a labyrinth from which it would take a hundred years to emerge. Modernity entailed a profound structural transformation, including the distribution of power. Historiography has approached this period from the perspective of the first crisis of Spanish capitalism. But, in reality, at the root of the economic problem was corruption.
Politicians, military officers, and nobles speculated in both the railway companies and in construction, to the point that at the end of the decade there was a stock market crash of biblical proportions. The Civil War in the United States caused an increase in the price of raw materials – cotton – the driving force behind the Catalan textile industry, which – due to a lack of foresight on the part of the state – led to the ruin of many businessmen in this sector. And a prolonged period of poor harvests led to a sharp rise in the price of basic foodstuffs, which had a negative effect on the lower classes. In this difficult context, and given that the state was so heavily in debt, two solutions were found: on the one hand, to increase the tax burden on the working classes and, on the other, to embark on a colonial adventure such as the War of the Chincha Islands off the coast of Peru.
1931. The mountains are a good place to think
That spring of 1931, Spain opted to manage power according to a formula that had failed in the past. Corruption had exhausted the system of the Borbonic Restoration and, therefore, a new relationship with power had to be sought. The question then – and still today – was whether Spain could be a federation of nations. It had to be proved! It was in this context that the deputies of the recently created government of the Generalitat of Catalonia, charged with drafting a proposal for a relationship between Catalonia and Spain, took up residence at the Sanctuary of Nuria. Everyone was certain that this was a historic moment.
The result was a constitutional text that responded to the will of Catalonia and its legitimate right to exercise self-determination. It was proposing a situation of legal and political equality with respect to the other peoples of the State. It was proposing to broaden our outlook. But the state became nervous. A year later, the Spanish Cortes approved a Statute that had nothing to do with the one endorsed months earlier by the people of Catalonia. It rejected the federal formula, reduced the powers of the Generalitat, and established the co-official status of Catalan and Spanish in a bilingual model. Catalonia was reduced to an “autonomous region within the Spanish state”. It was then that sabre rattling began to be heard in the distance, forcing Spain to return to the battlefield.
2004. Towards a new historical paradigm
With the hangover from the events of the last decade of the last century, everyone believed that Spain had chosen to recognise its diversity. The Catalan language was spoken – even – in the most intimate circles of the Castilian oligarchy. In a climate of economic strength, social stability, and mutual recognition, Catalonia believed it could rethink its relationship with Spain. Was it possible? The scrupulousness of the mission – as in the past – in drawing up a new constitutional framework, such as the new Statute of Catalonia, meant a major effort to find a meeting point where all social strata were represented. How this story continues is known to everyone. 1 October 2017 is the confirmation of the impossibility of dialogue and the need to go back to the beginning of everything: much earlier than the Castilian Civil War of 1479.
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How does machism manifest itself in the socio-economic world and in the consumerism of our society? Are we sufficiently aware of the micro machismo that we encounter in our day-to-day lives? What do women have to do to join and fully develop in the labour market? In a new episode of La Plaça de Territori 17, Lara de Castro, from the 11Onze Human Resources team, and Gemma Vallet, director of 11Onze District, answer all these questions.
Fortunately, ideas, attitudes and practices based on a learned cultural attribution of male superiority are becoming less and less present in our society. However, there is still a long way to go to eliminate sexist attitudes and micro machismo from everyday life. Looking at a man if you buy a car, or at a woman, if you buy a hoover, are behavioural practices that we have come to accept, but which are becoming increasingly unwelcome in a society that continues to evolve towards gender equality in all socio-cultural spheres.
As de Castro points out, “all of this is so commonplace, so normal, even for women, that until all of this is nipped in the bud, we will not be able to move forward“. Even so, there must also be a change of attitude on the part of women, “we will become more accepting of our bodies, our age, our wrinkles and the fact that we are women. That we are also capable of managing certain things that until now have only been managed by men”.
Gender pay gap, an unresolved issue
According to a report issued by CCOO, the gender pay gap has been reduced, but the average salary of women would have to grow by 24% to be equal to that of men. As Lara de Castro explains, “The pay gap is huge. But it is all about confidence, not only the confidence that the world gives me when it comes to earning money but also the confidence that I have when it comes to creating this money” she continues, “when I earn the money, it empowers me and makes me change my mentality”.
Advertising marketing has not facilitated this empowerment of women, on the contrary, it has helped to reinforce the macho attitude of society, even so, as Gemma Vallet points out, “advertising, in the end, is a mirror of society. And it is a mirror that amplifies. But as we adopt new behaviours, advertising will have to reflect these new behaviours”.
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China remains an attractive market for many Western companies, but the first quarterly deficit in foreign investment in its history underscores the challenges Beijing is facing to attract foreign businesses, against a backdrop of rising geopolitical tensions with the United States, low interest rates and weakening domestic demand.
Despite the good macroeconomic data on industrial production and retail sales in China presented last month, the Chinese economy is showing signs of exhaustion that may have negative ramifications for public finances, given the growing government debt.
Beyond the real estate crisis, US economic sanctions, the drop in exports experienced every month of 2023 compared to the previous year, low-interest rates and a weakening of domestic demand, foreign companies are pulling money out of the Chinese market at a faster pace than they are investing it.
In the July-September period, according to preliminary balance of payments data, foreign companies in China recorded a direct investment deficit of almost 10.854 billion euros. This is the first time the country has recorded such deficits since records began in 1998.
Low returns on investment
Weakening domestic demand and low-interest rates have meant that many of these companies are not getting the returns they expected from their businesses and are opting to take capital out of the country for higher returns or to reduce exposure to geopolitical risk. According to Goldman Sachs analysts, “Part of the weakness in direct investment inflows into China may be due to profit repatriation by multinational companies”.
Although this is not good news for China, Beijing has downplayed the importance of foreign capital flight. Wang Wentao, China’s Minister of Commerce, stressed that China remains a magnet for global investors and pledged further measures to expand consumption, as well as to stabilise foreign trade and investment, to promote a sustained economic recovery.
Whatever measures the Chinese government may implement, and given the great commercial interests or opportunities in the Chinese market, it would be premature to draw definitive conclusions about whether this investment shortfall is a one-off event or the start of a new trend that will continue over time.
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The price of gold soared in response to the ongoing armed conflict between Israel and Palestine. This is a similar rebound in value to the one experienced at the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Are geopolitical tensions a good indicator of the future prices of the precious metal?
It is no secret that gold tends to rise in value in the face of war, geopolitical tensions, or financial crises. Historically, this precious metal has been considered a safe-haven asset for investors precisely because it maintains or increases its value, compared to other financial assets, during periods of stock market uncertainty.
That said, just as, depending on various parameters, in times of stable economic growth, traditional investments in equities and bonds may offer higher profit potential, the relationship between geopolitical tensions and the price of the golden metal is also multifaceted.
The complex interplay between gold supply and demand rarely responds to a single trigger but is driven by several factors: economic sanctions, access to the oil market or the fluctuating value of the dollar are just some of the indicators associated with economic turbulence directly related to the upward movement of gold prices that often precede or are amplified by armed conflict.
Gold prices in the current geopolitical context
Since the armed conflict unleashed between Israel and Palestine on 7 October, the price of gold has risen by more than 10%, reaching a high above 1,900 euros per ounce, which has compensated for the losses that had occurred since the highs of May.
This rise in the price of gold is driven not so much by the armed conflict between these two actors, but by the possible ramifications if other countries in the region and the West become involved. While Lebanon, through Hezbollah, warned of possible retaliation unless the massacre in Gaza was stopped, Israel intensified its bombings in Syria, and the United States sent two aircraft carrier groups to the region, at the same time it was pointing to Iran as the trigger for the conflict.
The duration and escalation of war in the Middle East can directly influence the distribution and price of oil, creating the perfect storm for gold to rise in value. Even so, the rebound in the value of gold resulting from this Palestinian-Israeli conflict may only be short-term, as has been seen in the past.
As for the war in Ukraine, the boost to gold prices came mainly as a result of economic sanctions against Russia, which drove up the prices of hydrocarbons and other commodities, fuelling inflation that has devastated European economies. As well as the acceleration in the process of de-dollarisation of countries that want to shield their economies from Western sanctions.
Historical precedents have taught us that the rise in gold prices in the face of armed conflict often responds to the perceived risk to stock markets and governments, and while wars are an important factor, geopolitics is not an exact science. Discerning what represents an element of temporary noise or a real and significant impact on the economy and financial markets over time requires a deeper analysis of the background of these conflicts. However, we should remember that in the worst-case scenario, gold helps to diversify our portfolio, reducing the risk of losses and protecting our savings over the long term.
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