Public debt: a boon or a drag on the economy?

El deute públic en el món s’ha disparat en els últims anys i les seves xifres ja són similars a les del PIB global. Tot i que pot ser un recurs molt útil per estimular l’economia en moments d’estancament o per millorar la competitivitat d’un país, els actuals nivells de deute generen molta inquietud per com pot llastrar el creixement.

En macroeconomia, el deute públic no es considera necessàriament una cosa dolenta. De fet, pot ser molt positiva. Tot i que costi digerir aquesta afirmació contraintuïtiva, la veritat és que els Estats l’han utilitzat des de fa segles per finançar-se sense que, en la majoria dels casos, hagi conduït a la ruïna dels països.

Què determina llavors la seva incidència positiva o negativa en l’evolució de l’economia? Per què el que hauria de ser un recurs pot convertir-se en una llosa? Hi ha tres factors clau: com s’utilitzen aquests diners, el context competitiu global i el volum de deute.

Oli per al motor econòmic

L’economia és un complex engranatge que periòdicament passa per alts i baixos, en cicles que es van encadenant. Quan aquest engranatge s’encalla, el deute públic pot servir com a lubrificant per a millorar el seu funcionament. D’aquí ve que els Estats tendeixin a aplicar polítiques d’inversió pública expansives quan l’economia s’estanca i hagin d’aprofitar els cicles de creixement econòmic, en els quals augmenten els seus ingressos gràcies a la major recaptació, per a equilibrar els seus comptes.

El deute públic té conseqüències tant en el present com en el futur. L’objectiu més immediat és facilitar recursos per a evitar el col·lapse econòmic. Si en un context de crisi una empresa normalment rendible veu reduïdes les seves vendes i entra en números vermells, podria arribar a tancar. Com a conseqüència, augmentaria l’atur i el que fins llavors eren ingressos per a l’Estat gràcies als impostos sobre les seves vendes passarien a ser despeses en forma de prestacions per desocupació. Al seu torn, els menors ingressos dels treballadors reduirien la seva capacitat adquisitiva, amb la qual cosa cada vegada més empreses es veurien en una situació precària per la reducció de la demanda.

Per això el deute públic s’utilitza en un primer nivell per a frenar la sagnia en situacions excepcionals a través d’ajudes i estímuls fiscals que evitin la destrucció de teixit productiu. Això explica, per exemple, que ara es plantegi una rebaixa en la quota d’autònoms per evitar el tancament de moltes microempreses. I fins i tot el subsidi per desocupació i altres despeses corrents es podrien considerar instruments per evitar que la demanda s’enfonsi en un context d’estancament o recessió.

Si l’endeutament conjuntural fa possible que el sistema prengui aire i torni a ser competitiu sense els estímuls públics, l’economia podria sortir reforçada. Però si aquest endeutament tan sols serveix per mantenir viu el teixit productiu de manera artificial, estaríem davant una economia zombi, incapaç de sobreviure sense els estímuls públics, així que el deute podria fer-se crònic. D’aquí la importància de com s’utilitza el deute públic i d’acompanyar aquesta inversió de les necessàries reformes estructurals.

Competitivitat, la paraula màgica

Més enllà de parar el cop en una crisi, el deute públic també pot servir per augmentar el potencial de creixement d’una economia. La inversió pública en infraestructures, educació, sanitat o polítiques actives d’ocupació pot enfortir les bases per al futur desenvolupament.

Tot i que en un primer moment poden incrementar-se el dèficit i el deute, com a contrapartida tindrem una economia més forta. I això suposarà una major capacitat per fer front al pagament d’interessos i l’amortització del deute gràcies a la major recaptació.

Un exemple de bona praxi bastant acceptat és la inversió que va suposar la American Recovery and Reinvestment Act després de la crisi financera de 2007-2008. Els més de tres quarts de bilió de dòlars de despesa aprovats pel Congrés nord-americà van permetre modernitzar les infraestructures i xarxes tecnològiques als Estats Units. A més, la reforma sanitària i del sistema de desocupació va millorar la cohesió social. Tot això ha contribuït al fet que l’economia nord-americana es trobi avui dia en una situació una mica menys compromesa que l’europea.

De tota manera, des de fa bastants anys els països desenvolupats s’enfronten a una inquietant pèrdua de competitivitat, la qual cosa complica el seu creixement econòmic i limita la seva capacitat per equilibrar els seus nivells de deute.

Els riscos d’un deute excessiu

És necessari tenir present que, encara que el deute no sigui dolent en si mateix, suposa un compromís de devolució amb interessos en el futur. I això pot arribar a restringir el marge financer i pressupostari de l’Estat si no es produeix un augment d’ingressos que el compensi. A més, l’emissió de deute públic pot atreure capital que d’una altra manera es destinaria al finançament del sector privat.

Tot i que el límit de deute públic que estableix el Tractat de Maastricht per als Estats és del 60 % del seu PIB, el conjunt de països de la zona euro ja porta un any per sobre del 100 %, segons dades d’Eurostat. La situació fora d’Europa no és millor, ja que el Fons Monetari Internacional estima que, a finals de 2021, el deute públic global representava el 100 % del PIB mundial. I la situació podria empitjorar si la crisi s’accentua.

Espanya ja porta més d’una dècada per sobre de la recomanació del 60%. De fet, el Fons Monetari Internacional va fer una sèrie d’advertències a Espanya al març pel risc que el deute s’estanqui en cotes superiors al 115 % del PIB. Però, en vista de l’evolució actual, serà difícil que aquesta ràtio es redueixi en el futur pròxim. I més si tenim en compte l’estructura demogràfica, que en els pròxims anys dispararà la despesa en pensions.

La majoria d’economistes adverteixen contra aquest excés de deute públic. És significatiu que una revisió de 40 estudis publicats durant la dècada passada indiqui que 36 d’ells conclouen que el deute té una influència negativa en el creixement econòmic.

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Monitoring our driving is now inescapable, connected cars have become smartphones on wheels and are an additional business opportunity for all brands, from offering optional equipment via subscriptions to selling the data generated by millions of customers to third parties. Should we be concerned about this new loss of privacy?

As technology advances, internet-connected cars are becoming an increasingly present reality in our lives. Car manufacturers argue that these vehicles with no physical buttons, giant screens and full of cameras and sensors that monitor our behaviour offer a ‘safer’ and more comfortable driving experience.

This ability to communicate with other vehicles, devices and services via the Internet also opens up new business opportunities for brands. Some car manufacturers have already tested the patience of their customers with monthly subscription models for heated seats, while others offer more power in exchange for an annual subscription or are charging a subscription fee for the most popular options.

Moreover, this interconnection allows vehicles to collect and transmit real-time data on driving habits, location and vehicle status, offering additional revenue potential for brands willing to sell this information, which may pose a threat to users’ right to privacy.

From theory to reality

A report by the Mozilla Foundation warned that connected cars are “terrible in terms of privacy and security”. Also, it highlighted that 25 of the most popular car brands collect without consent a large amount of data from their users, not only strictly related to driving, such as their place of residence or usual destinations, but also much more sensitive data, such as facial expressions, health status and genetic information or information about their sex life, all of this through connected devices, microphones, and cameras.

According to the study, 84% of the brands surveyed share or sell owners’ data and 92% give drivers little or no control over their personal data. Although all brands fail in data handling, Tesla scores the worst, while Renault, Dacia and BMW have the least bad scores.

Some called this report alarmist, yet a few months later, the New York Times reported that some brands were already sharing data on their customers’ driving habits with insurers and that “bad drivers” had already had their policies raised by as much as 21%, without ever having had an accident.

Kenn Dahl, a computer scientist from Seattle in the United States who drives an electric Chevrolet Bolt, obtained a report from LexisNexis. This New York-based data agency works with insurers, which recorded the 640 times he or his wife had driven the car in the last six months, with all the details, such as start and end times, distances driven, and all the times he went over 130 km/h, or when he did hard braking or hard acceleration.

All this data was collected and, above all, sold without Mr. Dahl’s knowledge. In this case, it was sold to insurance companies, but it could just as easily have been sold to other companies in any field.

Are we protected by European law?

European legislation on the processing of personal data applied to connected cars is based on the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the ePrivacy Directive, which set out the principles and rights that have to be respected in the processing of personal data.

Among other obligations, data controllers have to inform data subjects about the use of their data, obtain their consent where necessary, ensure data security and confidentiality, minimise the amount and duration of data retention, and allow the exercise of the rights of access, rectification, erasure, limitation, objection and portability.

Basically, the same regulation that already applies to data processing and privacy on mobile devices, such as smartphones. That said, it is no secret that the devil is in the details, which is why experts always recommend that we carefully review the terms and conditions and only provide data or accept functionalities that provide real value, which is something we are used to when using a mobile phone, but which until recently was unthinkable to have to take into account every time we start up “our” vehicle.

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The general rise in prices is complicating the finances of many households. It is becoming increasingly difficult to balance the books to make ends meet and even more difficult to dedicate part of our income to savings. In view of this situation, here are eleven tips to improve household finances.

1. Apply the 50/30/20 rule. This first piece of advice is very simple. It is about spending 50% of our salary on basic needs (light, water, rent, mortgage, telephone, food, studies, and so on), about 30% of our salary on leisure (out-of-home breakfasts or lunches, holidays, gifts, and so on), and the rest, the remaining 20%, it goes to savings. 
2. Cancel unnecessary subscriptions. To how many digital platforms are we subscribed? Do we use them all? Should we continue to pay them? What about that subscription to that magazine we never read? All automatic subscriptions must be reviewed, and we must choose whether they are necessary and useful for us to continue paying. Today there are several online content platforms that are legal and free, you just have to look them up on the Internet. And remember that libraries are also a major source of books and also audiovisual content.
3. Review your electricity, gas, and phone contracts. We need to look very carefully at the contracts we have with the various electricity and gas companies and the type of contract we have for our mobile and home telephones. This is one of the factors that makes us spend money without being aware of the total expenses at the end of the year, as these are expenses without which we cannot live, but we can indeed reduce them.
4. More meals at home. Reducing the number of times we go out to eat or buy take-away food can become a very good source of savings. We must not stop going to restaurants either, but we must reduce meals outside, especially if our family is large; our pocket will appreciate it.
5. Reuse. When something gets damaged, see if you can repair it and extend its life before throwing it into the rubbish. Buying second-hand clothes, books, furniture, and even household appliances is also a good saving tool.
6. Avoid impulsive shopping. One of the main reasons why we do not make good use of our money is compulsive shopping. From now on, when you want something, give yourself time to think about whether you really need it. You will find out that you do not need much of what you want to buy.
7. Compare prices. How many times have you bought a mobile phone, for example, and the next day you see an offer for the same product in another shop? That’s not comparing. We must learn to compare everything we buy, including food when we go to the supermarket or when we buy in superstores.
8. Use the car less frequently. The car is an expense many people cannot do without, but we can reduce it. If possible, try to share a car or make use of the means of public transport. As far as possible, use a bicycle, and above all, use your legs, for walking is healthy and free.
9. Choose a good financial institution. How many credit cards do we have? Do we need to have so many? What commissions does our financial institution charge us? We think it is enough to have a financial institution that supports us because that is where we keep our money, we receive our salary, and we are charged all our expenses, as well as where we pay our bills. But we have to check if this financial entity helps us to have a good personal economy, or if, on the contrary, we need a change. Nowadays, there are many financial institutions with tools that help you to control your expenses and at the same time help you to save: let’s choose a good financial institution for our future.
10. Adapt to your income. If you earn a certain amount, do not do more than your economy can afford. You do not have to go all out; make responsible use of your money according to your earnings.
11. Be far-sighted. We should analyse the evolution of our expenses in recent months to see where our money is going and where we can cut back. Given the current inflationary situation, in some cases, it will be necessary to apply a “war economy” depending on how we foresee the evolution of income and expenses.

Money does not create happiness, we know this already. But we can transform our money into a tool that can bring peace of mind to our personal economy. Given the current inflationary situation, in some cases, it will be necessary to apply a “war economy” depending on how we foresee the evolution of income and expenses.

If you want to discover the best option to protect your savings, enter Preciosos 11Onze. We will help you buy at the best price the safe-haven asset par excellence: physical gold.

Tots estem familiaritzats amb els conceptes bàsics de les assegurances. Però, saps com funciona aquest sector, quina és la seva regulació i d’on provenen els seus beneficis?

Les assegurances no són més que eines financeres que permeten cobrir determinats riscos. Ho fan des de fa milers d’anys. El Codi de Hammurabi, un compendi de lleis de l’antiga Babilònia, ja regulava els préstecs a risc de mar, que feien possible a prestadors i naviliers compartir els riscos i els beneficis del comerç marítim.

A tots ens sonen més o menys els conceptes bàsics de les assegurances. Una pòlissa no és més que un contracte entre l’assegurat i la companyia d’assegurances mitjançant la qual, a canvi d’una prima (preu de l’assegurança), l’entitat asseguradora es compromet a indemnitzar per un mal produït o a satisfer un capital, renda o una altra prestació en cas de produir-se un sinistre contemplat en les cobertures d’aquest contracte.

Tots els detalls de la cobertura de l’assegurança i altres condicions estan recollits en la pòlissa, que estableix els drets i obligacions de totes dues parts. El prenedor, que és la persona o empresa que contracta el segur i paga la prima; l’assegurat, que és qui està exposat al risc cobert per l’assegurança, i el beneficiari, que és qui té dret a rebre la contraprestació convinguda en la pòlissa, poden coincidir o ser diferents persones o entitats.

És probable que aquests conceptes ens resultin familiars. Però, sabem com funciona el sector assegurador? Repassem com es regula i d’on provenen els seus beneficis.

El marc regulador

Existeixen diferents tipus d’entitats asseguradores en funció de la seva constitució jurídica: societats anònimes, mútues, cooperatives i mutualitats de previsió social. A més, cadascuna d’elles pot operar en un o en múltiples àmbits (automòbil, llar, responsabilitat civil…), però sempre requereixen l’autorització de l’organisme regulador.

Per garantir el correcte funcionament del sector, estan regulats tant les característiques com el funcionament d’aquestes entitats, establint límits a la seva activitat i imposant uns mínims de solvència o una certa formació per als seus empleats.

L’1 de gener de 2016 va entrar en vigor Solvència II, la directiva europea per la qual totes les asseguradores europees estimen la seva solidesa financera de la mateixa manera. Aquesta directiva obliga a calcular la quantitat de recursos que ha de tenir un assegurador per afrontar possibles escenaris negatius relacionats amb el negoci (que hi hagi més contratemps de l’esperat o que les indemnitzacions siguin de major import), amb les inversions (una caiguda de la Borsa, per exemple) o d’altres tipus. L’assegurador ha de tenir fons propis suficients com per a cobrir aquest eventual forat.

Solvència II se sustenta en tres pilars. El primer determina els recursos propis mínims requerits a cada asseguradora en funció dels riscos assumits. El segon planteja la valoració qualitativa dels riscos, que són identificats, mesurats, monitorats i administrats segons l’exposició al risc de cada companyia, i estableix un control intern d’aquests riscos a través del govern corporatiu per millorar l’eficiència i la rendibilitat de les entitats. El tercer pilar busca una major transparència de les empreses asseguradores gràcies als informes periòdics que han de presentar.

Aquesta directiva europea es complementa amb la Llei d’ordenació, supervisió i solvència de les entitats asseguradores i reasseguradores, que regula el sector en l’Estat espanyol.

Una primera font d’ingressos

Segons dades del Fons Monetari Internacional, el volum de primes emeses en el món arribava l’any 2016 als 24 bilions d’euros, dels quals el 85% pertanyien a assegurances de vida.

En el cas de les assegurances de vida, el principal canal de comercialització és el bancari, amb una quota de mercat una mica superior al 70%, mentre que els agents i corredors d’assegurances presenten una quota de mercat lleugerament per sobre del 20%.

En canvi, la resta d’assegurances es comercialitzen principalment a través d’agents i corredors d’assegurances, els qui aconsegueixen una quota de mercat del 60% aproximadament, seguits per la venda directa (19%) i el canal bancari (13%).

Una primera via per la qual les companyies d’assegurances guanyen diners és avaluant acuradament el risc de cadascuna d’aquestes pòlisses perquè els ingressos per primes superin a les reclamacions que hagin d’abonar.

La veritable naturalesa del negoci

No obstant això, les asseguradores són sobretot gestores dels recursos que els seus clients els confien a través de les primes, ja que utilitzen part d’aquests ingressos per invertir. De fet, es calcula que el 12% dels actius mundials estan en mans de companyies d’assegurances.

Això sí, a partir de la gran crisi financera, la legislació estableix uns límits prudencials estrictes a l’hora d’invertir. Fins l’any 2007, el sector assegurador va viure un idíl·lic període de tranquil·litat. Però la gran crisi financera, que es va emportar per davant al gegant de les assegurances nord-americà AIG, va aflorar l’estreta relació de les asseguradores amb les entitats bancàries, tant per la participació en el seu capital social com en les seves emissions de renda fixa i variable.

Segons Unespa, que aglutina a prop de 200 asseguradores de l’Estat espanyol, aquestes inverteixen principalment en deute públic i, en menor mesura, en fons i accions privades: per cada euro invertit en aquests últims, es dediquen sis al deute públic. A més, aquesta associació aclareix que, en èpoques de bonança econòmica “les asseguradores han arribat a tenir una capacitat d’inversió equivalent al 2 % del PIB”.

Les reassegurances, un negoci en auge

Una tercera via d’ingressos són les reassegurances. Es tracta d’acords mitjançant els quals un assegurador, denominat cedent, transfereix a un altre assegurador, denominat reassegurador, la totalitat o una part dels seus riscos a canvi d’una part de la prima. Això permet al cedent protegir-se de grans pèrdues potencials en situacions d’excessiva exposició.

El canvi climàtic i la pandèmia de COVID-19 estan impulsant aquesta àrea de negoci, el volum del qual s’espera que superi els 500.000 milions d’euros l’any 2025.

Grans canvis en l’horitzó

Molts senyals indiquen que el sector assegurador es prepara per a una època de canvis transcendentals. En aquest sentit, s’espera que es formin ecosistemes en els quals proveïdors de diferents indústries interactuaran per crear valor a partir de dades compartides. Per tant, no es vendran tant productes i serveis aïllats com experiències creades gràcies a una multitud d’actors.

El 67% dels líders del sector assegurador consideren que els models de negoci actuals seran irrecognoscibles en els pròxims cinc anys i que aquests ecosistemes seran el principal agent de canvi, segons dades d’Accenture Research. A més, el 58% de les companyies asseguradores asseguren buscar ja de manera activa ecosistemes en els quals integrar-se i tres de cada quatre preveuen que almenys la meitat dels seus beneficis procediran d’aquests ecosistemes en els pròxims cinc anys.

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Tenint en compte que vivim en un planeta amb recursos finits, el model econòmic actual basat en un creixement il·limitat sembla destinat al col·lapse. Però hi ha una alternativa viable? Estem preparats per assumir les conseqüències d’una reducció deliberada de la producció i del consum? 

El creixement econòmic mundial es va veure esperonat per la revolució industrial i es va disparar a la fi de la Segona Guerra Mundial amb l’eclosió del consumisme. A partir dels anys 50 va començar un ràpid procés de creixement econòmic sense precedents que, tot i les recessions, s’ha mostrat imparable.

El consum d’energia per càpita va seguir un camí paral·lel després d’haver-se mantingut relativament estable durant dècades. I el mateix podem dir sobre l’ús de fertilitzants, consum d’aigua, producció de paper, etc. De la mateixa manera, les emissions de gasos d’efecte hivernacle i la pèrdua de biodiversitat van augmentar exponencialment.

És evident que aquest procés de desenvolupament va lligat a un augment de l’ús de recursos naturals, la contaminació i el canvi climàtic. Per tant, cal plantejar una transformació conscient i planificada de l’estructura econòmica i social per fer-la més sostenible. 

Per a avançar cap aquesta transició ecològica es necessiten pactes que facin possible una reducció dels negocis ambientalment nocius en benefici d’altres més sostenibles i que formin part d’una economia circular. Potser més important, cal un canvi de mentalitat de la societat i, encara més difícil, d’una classe política ara supeditada als interessos corporatius.

Fugint d’una falsa dicotomia

A diferència del creixement econòmic, que es mesura per l’augment del producte interior brut (PIB), el concepte del decreixement econòmic és un moviment social i polític que fomenta la reducció deliberada de la productivitat i el consum i que promou la redistribució de la riquesa per assolir una vida més sostenible i equilibrada.

Els debats sobre l’actitud a prendre enfront del canvi climàtic o el model de creixement econòmic imperant sovint es redueixen a la confrontació entre aquests dos extrems. Per una banda, els partidaris de no canviar res per mantenir l’statu quo, per l’altra, els que ho volen canviar tot per desmantellar el sistema actual i substituir-lo per un model de decreixement. 

Es tracta d’un fals dilema que divideix a la societat i no representa al públic en general. No té per què ser així. Per exemple, d’igual manera que tots podem estar d’acord a dir que és preferible millorar el benestar social en comptes d’empitjorar-lo, o el funcionament de les institucions públiques, o evitar els conflictes bèl·lics, segurament també ens posaríem d’acord si parléssim en termes de creixement sostenible o decreixement de les indústries contaminants. 

Per altra part, no es pot aplicar la mateixa solució en l’àmbit global. El creixement econòmic ve acompanyat de la prosperitat i és molt fàcil i, fins i tot d’hipòcrita, advocar per un model de decreixement econòmic mundial des d’una posició de privilegi envers els països en vies de desenvolupament. Un dilema que no és nou i que ja ha generat tensions quant a les quotes de reducció de gasos d’efecte hivernacle.

De la mateixa manera, un decreixement econòmic imposat requeriria una intervenció estatal i una pèrdua de llibertats sense precedents, almenys en una societat democràtica. Estem preparats per assumir aquest major control governamental després del que s’ha vist amb les protestes dels pagesos en contra d’aquest tipus de mesures que s’han produït al llarg d’Europa? Podem assumir més impostos i més restriccions en el que podem o no podem fer?

No hi ha cap dubte que aquesta transició cap a un model de societat més sostenible és necessària, tanmateix, tant si s’opta per mantenir, incrementar o reduir el creixement econòmic, la solució passarà necessàriament per adoptar un model híbrid que sigui viable i capaç de cohesionar al conjunt de la societat.

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The European automotive industry is at a critical juncture as a result of high production costs, loss of competitiveness to Chinese brands and controversial EU legislative requirements. The new European anti-emissions regulation, which comes into force in January 2025 aims to revive stagnant sales of electric cars and will be accompanied by multimillion-dollar fines that could end up sinking one of the pillars of the European industry.

The European Union will open 2025 with the implementation of the CAFE (Clean Air for Europe) regulation, which requires average CO₂ emissions in each manufacturer’s vehicles to be reduced by 15% compared to 2021. Between 2030 and 2034, a 55% reduction in emissions will be required for new passenger cars and 50% for vans.

The CAFE regulation was adopted in 2019 as a plan to gradually reduce emissions from new vehicles marketed in the European Union, with the aim to ban sales of petrol, diesel, and hybrid combustion vehicles from 2035.

Until now, this cap was 115.1 g/km and from January 2025 it will be reduced to 93.6 g/km. In addition, car manufacturers will face a fine of 95 euros for each gram of CO2 per kilometre above this limit, multiplied by the number of cars sold.

The European car industry, between a rock and a hard place

The European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) has long warned that the European car industry is unlikely to be able to comply with the regulation and could pay up to 16 billion euros in fines, a figure that would threaten the viability of the entire European car industry.

According to statements made by the employers’ organisation to Europa Press, electric vehicle sales in Europe are stuck at around 13% market share, 10 percentage points below where they should be: “A gap too big to close in time”.

Car manufacturers warn that the mass adoption of electric vehicles, which is necessary to meet these regulations, is not progressing at the expected pace. This is due to factors such as the high price of electric vehicles, the lack of adequate charging infrastructure and consumer reluctance.

In this context, a paradox is created, whereby manufacturers may be forced to stop production and sales of ICE vehicles to compensate for the lack of electric car sales to avoid multi-billion dollar fines. Even so, further affecting brands’ poor profitability and exacerbating job cuts and factory closures.

Europe’s major brands are talking about ‘potentially irreversible damage’ if environmental requirements are not reduced and have been announcing production cuts, factory closures and a rethink of their goal of becoming pure electric vehicle manufacturers by the end of the decade.

China’s challenge and risk to competitiveness

Competition from China’s automotive sector is eroding the European car industry’s market share. Production costs in Europe, including high wages and skyrocketing energy prices thanks to the own-goal sanctions against Russia, put European manufacturers at a disadvantage compared to their Chinese competitors. The latter, supported by a more efficient supply chain and substantial government subsidies, are rapidly expanding their presence in the global market.

The European Union (EU) has recognised this challenge and is attempting to respond with policies of economic protectionism, but on the rebound, it is also punishing European carmakers that have offshored production to China.

For their part, some European countries such as France, Italy, and Romania have tried unsuccessfully to put pressure on Brussels to delay the implementation of the regulation or the fines. However, considering that the automotive sector represents 7% of the EU GDP and 6.1% of employment, with 13.8 million direct or indirect jobs, it cannot be ruled out that the European Commission will propose possible changes to this regulation to the European Parliament after drafting its report assessing the implementation of the new regulation.

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The geopolitical scenario favours the business of the Americans, who have become the main supplier of Spain and the rest of the European Union. In January 2022, the main European supplier was Russia, with 31% of imports.

When we talk about oil, we tend to think of Russia, the Arab countries and Venezuela. But the truth is that, a few years ago, the United States went from being a net importer of oil to being the world’s largest exporter of crude oil. The Americans say they are producing 13 million barrels a day, on top of the estimated 10 million barrels produced by Saudi Arabia and the 9.5 million produced by Russia.

Spain is not exempt from this trend, either. As recently revealed by the Corporación de Rerservas Estratégicas de Productos Petrolíferos, the United States is already the main supplier of oil to the Spanish state, with 8.7 million tons of crude, more than 31% from the year 2022. The entry of the United States into oil production has been lightning fast, since in 2015 not a single American barrel was imported into Spain.

The ideal geopolitical context

Oil is, as everyone knows, key to the functioning of Western economies. In addition, the fact that it is finite and the environmental pressure to stop using it causes a paradoxical effect: production increases and prices remain high. Americans seem to be in a rush to sell off their oil reserves before a cleaner alternative takes hold. But, in addition, oil is undoubtedly the best way to maintain the use of the dollar in international transactions and to correct the deficit trade balance of the United States.

The oil industry in the United States extracting WTI oil (West Texas Intermediate, oil from Texas and Oklahoma) coincides with the sanctions on Russia. Sanctions that also hinder the maritime traffic of other producers such as Nigeria, which until now was the main Spanish supplier.

European dependence

The Americans have therefore managed to position themselves as Europe’s main suppliers of oil and gas, displacing Russia. Until January 2022, Russia provided 31% of the oil needed by the European Union. Despite the sanctions, this has not been a serious problem for Russia, which maintains its production rate of 9.5 million barrels but sells them to India and China.

All of this has the unwanted, or calculated, effect of making the European Union dependent on the oil and gas of the United States. This is a situation of fragility in a strategic for European industry and the population: access to energy. While the energy revolution continues to advance, always more slowly than necessary, the United States has managed to short-circuit the excellent European customer. America’s oil production competitors fall from grace or are singled out as evil or responsible for climate change. At the same time, silently and in record time, the United States is already the world leader in the export of hydrocarbons. The feeling is inescapable that in geopolitics and economics, coincidences do not exist.

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A decade after the People’s Republic of China launched the Belt and Road Initiative with the aim of developing a global infrastructure for trade and international cooperation, the project faces new geopolitical challenges that will shape its future.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the New Silk Road, was launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping. It is one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects ever conceived and was originally intended to increase trade and economic cooperation between East Asia and Europe. Over the last ten years, the project has been extended to Africa, Oceania and Latin America, exponentially increasing investment in infrastructure.

In addition to this logistical structure is the Maritime Silk Road, which includes ports and coastal infrastructure from China’s western seaboard to Europe, India, Africa, the Pacific and Latin America. This is paramount considering that China currently has 95 ports, six of which are ranked in the world’s top 10.

Aiming to connect 65% of the world’s population and a third of the world’s GDP to China by creating a network of sea routes and land links, it has captured the world’s attention for its global reach and economic, political and social implications. The Chinese government announced that the initiative is “ushering in a new era of globalisation”, and will facilitate a “golden age of trade that will benefit everyone”.

As of July this year, total investments under the project exceeded $1 trillion, to the point of competing directly with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This money comes mainly from the New Development Bank, the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

An unstoppable multipolar world

While the initiative has been praised for fostering economic development and cooperation between countries, offering win-win conditions that were not available under the monopoly of Western powers, there have also been some critical voices. Some participating countries have expressed concerns about the transparency of the projects, whether they will be able to cope with the debt burden or what their dependence on China will be if they cannot repay the loans.

Much of this criticism and pressure for certain countries to refuse to collaborate with the Asian giant comes from the United States, which sees its hegemony as a global economic and geopolitical power increasingly fading in favour of other emerging actors, such as Russia and China, which want to maintain their sovereignty free from the tentacles of the West.

The success of the project makes it a perfect tool to expand China’s political and economic influence even further, with preferential access to new markets and natural resources hitherto dominated almost exclusively by Western powers, which are watching in despair as economic cycles and financial markets focus less and less on them.

In this context, the latest BRICS summit, where it was announced that six more countries will join the economic bloc, has created a great deal of expectation. Even so, it has highlighted the difficulty of unifying interests given the sensitivities of all member states. The expansion of the BRI may be the rallying point that bridges the cracks, especially among African countries that have called for China to move from infrastructure construction to local industrialisation, and India, which is also interested in financing flagship projects in developing countries in the global south, as a counterpart in the West.

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Newton’s first law states that an object always tends to be either at rest or in motion, rectilinear motion, unless an external force alters its state. Therefore, if a centripetal force acts on this object, it will be trapped by an invisible force called the central force. In this way, the object will see its movement altered, its inertia modified, and it will be difficult for it to return to its original physical state.

The Aragonese economist and historian José Larraz López, a distinguished member of the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, wrote an interesting book on economics in 1943 entitled ‘La época del mercantilismo en Castilla (1500-1700)’. He was a procurator in Franco’s Cortes and Franco’s minister in 1939, just after the end of the civil war – and therefore a man committed to Franco’s dictatorship to the bone – and when referring to the unity of Spain, he argued that the political reality of that time – between the 15th and 18th centuries – had been very different from that of his own time. Consequently, we could not speak of the existence of a single unitary state – Spain – for all those centuries, which would be the case after the arrival of the Bourbons.

The fact is that both Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria, León and Castile – the original core of the kingdom – and the three Basque provinces – Alava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya – plus Extremadura, Andalusia, and Murcia will end up forming part of the same integrated body. In this way, the central part of the Iberian Peninsula – the area stretching from the Cantabrian coast to the Strait of Gibraltar – will end up sharing the same border, and the same Cortes will legislate the territories – the Castilian Cortes – which will use the same currency and all together will follow the same economic and fiscal policy. Pardon, except for the three Basque provinces which, from the 14th century onwards, would be exempt from all Castilian taxes. It is therefore clear that the other peninsular territories – Portugal and the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation – were never part of this Castilian matrix.

Indeed, in the mid-15th century, the Iberian Peninsula was divided into five political blocs of unequal importance: Portugal, the territories of the Crown of Castile, the Kingdom of Navarre, the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation and the Muslim Emirate of Granada. In fact, by the middle of the 15th century, each of these groups of territories would eventually acquire a very distinct personality and become original societies with their own customs, their own legal peculiarities, their own institutions and even their own language.

That a historian of the darkest period of the dictatorship – such as José Larraz López – should serve to combat the colossal misinformation or ignorance wanted by current Spanishism should shame a part of the political class, the media – including the ‘influencers’ hidden behind the networks – who time and again, from their supreme tribunes, have not tired and will never tire of proclaiming the existence of a unitary Spain for more than five hundred years.

The Castilian oligarchy -for too long and although speaking Catalan in private-repeats over and over again the same mistake when they speak of Spain as a political reality since the 15th century, referring to it as ‘the oldest nation in Europe’. If they understood once and for all that from the 15th century to the early 18th century, Castile pursued a policy of zero integration of the Mediterranean – and Portuguese – world, and that this was only possible through the use of force, combined with persistent repression and a constant plundering of economic resources in order to modulate their legitimate aspirations, it would surely help them to understand many issues that happen to us today as a state. More specifically, it would help them to understand that the Spanish project – as it has been set out since the arrival of the Bourbons – is totally unsustainable.

The beginning of the Hispanic divergences

After the Navas de Tolosa, Castile definitively entered the interior of the lower Meseta, which provoked a period of extreme euphoria in view of the possibilities offered by the new territory. But it soon realised that, despite its determination, it was encountering the same problem that León had encountered at the end of the 12th century. It was after the Concordia de Benavent – the agreement on the purchase of the kingdom of León by Castile – that Castile – except the Granada Kingdom, acquired practically the current perimeter.

The lower plateau, with its mountainous and rugged terrain -especially in the areas closest to the Central system-had land that was unsuitable for agriculture -except for the Guadalquivir valley-, with scarce and poor quality pastures, which, added to the strong climatic variability between summer and winter, were too adverse factors to be able to take control quickly. In addition, there were three even more determining factors: the low birth rate of the population in the north, the lack of mobility of inhabitants from the north to the south – despite the promotion of the ‘presuras’ or territorial divisions – and the consequences of applying an excessively repressive policy against the native population – by arguing nonsense – which culminated in the expulsion of the Andalusian Moriscos.

All these factors would have a very negative impact on the Castilian economy because any manufacturing and commercial activity, such as trade with the East or Africa across the Straits of Gibraltar, would be nipped in the bud. In any case, the Monarchy – in order to prolong its expansionary policy – continued to need to increase its regular income, which contributed to a situation of extreme inflation, resulting in a monetary alteration and generating a permanent deficit in its balance of trade.

As a solution, the Monarchy exerted strong fiscal pressure on some sectors of the population – such as the Jews, for example – but above all on the great transhumant herds of the upper plateau, just at the time when both Flanders and northern Italy were becoming the great buyers of Castilian wool. This plains traffic had catapulted Burgos to the forefront of European cities and turned the Cantabrian Sea into an important maritime axis towards Europe, which stimulated the birth of a textile industry. But all this faded away as soon as the interests of the nobility – the owners of the land, based on ancient rights of conquest – prevailed over any private initiative of the plainsmen, which made it impossible for the economy to flourish in the following centuries.

Faced with economic suffocation, the Monarchy – in order to boost the economy – resorted to the credit offered by the Jewish communities settled in the main Hispanic cities. So it was, sooner rather than later, that kings, nobles, military orders, ecclesiastical communities and ‘councils’ – and even individuals or ‘situados’, as they were known at the time – ended up abusing credit, which in the long run became a real internal problem. Faced with the heavy indebtedness of the Castilian public treasury, the Monarchy – as a result of the generalisation of non-payments – began to reform its financial system, although the real trigger was the promulgation of the Edict of Granada – also known as the Decree of the Alhambra – by which the Catholic Monarchs decreed the expulsion of all Jews from the Hispanic territories, which meant obtaining large assets for the Monarchy in the short term.

As for the rest of the peninsular territories – above all the Mediterranean and the Portuguese Atlantic world – they were able to find in the sea a lever for growth that allowed them to continue with their expansionist policies. For example, the Catalan commercial bourgeoisie was able to take advantage of the consequences of the war with France – the famous crusade of Philip Ardid – to boost its manufacturing industry. The creation of the Consulates of the Sea and the extension of old maritime routes – begun in the 10th century – were the mechanisms of penetration that the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation used to satisfy the demand for its products – rags, iron tools, coral, leather, spices and slaves – both in the mainland markets – Lisbon, Donostia, Bilbao and Seville – and in the foreign markets of Sardinia, Sicily, Bruges, Constantinople, Tunisia, and Alexandria.

A territory made up of ‘free people

From the beginning of feudal expansion – at the beginning of the 9th century – the territories of the northwest peninsular were configured under the juridical-administrative formula of ‘dominium’, based on Roman law, which meant that the holder of the land property was a ‘dominus’ or lord. Therefore, the king or the count – the highest figure in the social pyramid – from the beginning became the final owner – directly or indirectly – of all those lands that were expropriated.

It should be borne in mind that no lord would have the slightest interest in owning land, water, herds or mills if there were no peasants capable of organising stable work processes that would lead to the conversion of effort into income. Therefore, with the creation of Extremadura from the 9th century onwards, the Castilian-Leonese expansionist policy was implemented by means of the ‘villa and land’ communities, which would become the key element of political-legal organisation within the ‘new expropriated territories’. In this way, the landscape of the Meseta was articulated on the basis of the foundation of a series of major towns – walled and with representation in the Castilian Cortes – on which depended six or eight unwalled hamlets located around the main town.

For the lords, the real danger lay in the existence – within that vast territory – of free peasant communities that could escape the new jurisdiction. For this reason, they created mechanisms that involved a brutal indebtedness of those communities of ‘villa and land’ through the famous settlement charters or ‘asentamientos’ and the ‘presura’ contracts, so that they would lose all possible mobility, remain attached to the land and, in this way, ensure the return of the debts contracted.

And since the king’s life was so ‘sacrificial’ – it still is today when they indulge in the luxury of elephant hunting – they ended up ceding the land for services rendered to other lords, ecclesiastical bodies or monasteries. Therefore, it depended on who was the final rentier – that is, the owner – whether the land was known as ‘realengas’, if it belonged to the king; if it belonged to an abbot or a bishop; ‘de solariego’, if it belonged to a nobleman or a military order; or de ‘behetría’, if it was the villagers themselves who chose the lord. In the long run, all these types of property would contribute to the formation of the large estates of the region – known as the process of ‘seigniorialisation’ – which, from the 14th century onwards, would lead to the concentration of much power, both economic and territorial, in a very small part of the Castilian population.

Towards a new conception of the stat

At the end of the 15th century, the Castilian-Leonese world would end up ‘expropriating’ some 385,000 km² of land – between the upper and lower plateau – on which nearly four and a half million people would live, including the Granada population. In the rest of the peninsula, the population would be distributed as follows: in the territories of the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation, about nine hundred thousand people would live on about 110,000 km²; about one hundred and twenty thousand people would live on 11,000 km² in Navarre; and in Portugal, one million people would live on 88,000 km².

Castile, although it was the largest territory in the Iberian Peninsula, continued to experience continuous economic and demographic problems, mainly driven by the process of consolidation of ‘seigniorialisation’, to the detriment of the exhausted expansive economy, which had been based on the indiscriminate expropriation of land and the reallocation of property through physical coercion.

Then, during the second half of the 15th century, the Castilian Monarchy began a process of economic transformation through monetary and fiscal reform, which led to a major social imbalance, to the point that it ended up having a direct impact on noble interests. As a result, major disturbances broke out throughout the kingdom and, unable to calm things down, the Monarchy applied a policy of manorial satisfaction by offering more land, more rights and more pensions for life at the expense of the public treasury and financed by a special tax on the population of the towns of the ‘Comuneros0. To top it all off, in the early 16th century, the main Communities of Castile were forced to assume a considerable tax to cover the purchase of the Imperial title – by the Habsburg family – which led to the famous Revolt of the ‘Comuneros’.

Even so, this policy had an insufficient impact in placating the ambitions of the nobility, which brought to light the existence of a much deeper division within the Castilian aristocracy. The existence of two politically antagonistic factions soon became apparent: on the one hand, there were the Pacheco, Villena and Girón families, who were in favour of taking a more active part in the kingdom’s major political decisions and therefore saw the need to weaken the Monarchy in order to control it. On the other hand, there were the Santillanas and Mendozas who understood that the time had come to abstain from power because the Monarchy was the one that had to guarantee the stability of the kingdom to ensure its ‘seigniorial’ privileges… ‘in saecula saeculorum’.

After the Castilian Civil War (1475-1479), the two largest territories of the Iberian Peninsula – the Kingdom of Castile and the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation – created a new political entity known as the Hispanic Monarchy, which was soon joined by Granada (1492), Portugal (1497) and Navarre (1512). That new dynastic state was shaped by the union of only two key elements: the army and foreign policy. For the rest of the elements that would make up the modern state, such as borders, currencies, laws and institutions, they remained completely separate.

Thus, the configuration and distribution of power – agreed by both sides at the Concordia de Segovia – was structured as follows: while Castile was structured according to the sacralised authority of the queen and always above the nobility and the church – thanks to an effective policy of numbing the Cortes – the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation was organised around the Constitution of Observance, which would always oblige the king to govern and make agreements in accordance with the laws of the Principality.

In the long run, Castile would offer less resistance to the Hispanic monarchs, something that would not happen within the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation, which, while respecting all its legal-political realities, would end up limiting the non-agreed initiatives between the different arms – count-king, nobility, clergy and honest citizens – that would represent part of the confederate society. The historian John Elliott in his famous book ‘Imperial Spain (1469-1716)’ very aptly defined it as follows: the Spanish sovereigns (Castilians) were absolute kings in Castile and constitutional monarchs in Aragon (Catalonia).

The unconscious empire

Only chance and the trade winds led the first navigators of the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation to the most populated area of the American continent. From the very beginning of the westward voyages, the first navigators were certain and aware that where they had arrived was not the East Indies, but a completely different territory. Realising this fact, the Castilian Monarchy deployed all its modern legal and administrative machinery to legitimately possess it. Without entrusting itself to anyone and by right of conquest, the Monarchy once again claimed ownership of those territories, ignoring the indigenous population.

The discovery of important deposits of precious metals – between Mexico and Peru – led to the founding or re-founding of important American cities, which acquired a new territorial role in order to ensure a regular flow of wealth to Castile. Thus, acting as nouveau riche, Castile would spend an indecent amount of economic resources to build its concept of civilisation, based on Catholicism. This obsession – sometimes uncontrolled – would lead them to embark on a myriad of conflicts of all kinds, such as theological disputes, family conflicts, commercial affairs or lavish megalomaniac constructions.

However, at the beginning of the 17th century, the American mines began to show signs of depletion, which became more pronounced as the century progressed. Faced with this slowdown, and in order to maintain the same rate of expenditure, the Monarchy resorted to loans from German banks – the Fuggers and the Welsers – and the Genoese banks of the Spinola, Centurione, Balbi, Strata and, above all, Gio Luca Pallavicino families. It would then be forced to raise taxes and exert fiscal pressure on the whole of Hispanic society. We remember the famous ‘Union of Arms’ of the Duke of Olivares. Faced with a generalised avalanche of non-payments, the State entered into a process of successive bankruptcies (1627, 1647, 1652 and 1662), which contributed to projecting a very unfavourable image of Spain in the eyes of the other European chancelleries.

Spain’s history is still stigmatised today by a ‘black legend’ conceived between the 16th and 17th centuries – both by the Lutherans of Wittenberg and the Dutch of Dillenburg – which sought to chip away at its hegemony in the world. Subsequently, in order to control the raw materials of the Castilian and Portuguese colonies, the English would amplify Protestant propaganda as a key element of discrediting the colonial elites, something that would help them to initiate and finance the independence processes of the Spanish colonies throughout the 19th century.

The Bourbon drift

Castile – and later Spain – has always found itself in a dangerous vicious circle, in which the State’s expenditure has been excessive, and it has needed to continually increase taxes to balance its income, which has led – over a prolonged period of time – to an excessive fiscal pressure on the population as a whole.

With the entry of the Bourbons – after a long campaign to discredit the Habsburgs – the economic problems worsened when, through the use of continuous loans, on-lending, negotiations and renegotiations, these only served to satisfy their personal ‘grandeur’, to the detriment of the modernisation of society by the Enlightenment spirit that prevailed throughout Europe.

The Bourbons were always aware that the only way to economically sustain the entire Hispanic kingdom was to annex all the peninsular territories and thus form a new geopolitical hexagon. However, this was not possible because from the end of the 17th century, Portugal was no longer part of the Hispanic Monarchy, although attempts were made to annex it on three occasions during the 19th and 20th centuries. Therefore, efforts could only focus on the territories of the Levant peninsular which, first with the War of Succession and then with the Nueva Planta Decrees, allowed the Bourbons to link productive sectors – master craftsmen and merchants – to the new centralist system. As a result, this loyalty to the Bourbons allowed those who supported the new regime to gain access to large public contracts, which led to their absolute dependence on the new centralist system, which ended up weaving a web of widespread corruption at all levels of public administration.

There is no shortage of examples, such as when at the beginning of the 19th century Queen Maria Cristina – widow of Ferdinand VII – handed over power to the Spanish liberals, who at the same time made a pact with the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie to forge a self-interested political and socio-biological alliance that would materialise with the institution of a protectionist system. In this way, the Catalan mercantile tradition was squandered and the spirit of 1705 was betrayed, because the Bourbon refusal to free trade the Principality with England and the Netherlands – its main trading partners – initiated the whole process that would converge on 11 September 1714.

Nor did the establishment of the ‘democratic regime of “78” improve matters for the interests of the Levant peninsular. In fact, we Catalans, Valencians and Balearic Islanders suffer the consequences on a daily basis when, year after year, we contribute a massive amount of our GDP to the State coffers for the sake of a ‘solidarity-based centrality’ and, let us remember, with the approval of politicians, industrialists, and bankers. And the story continues to the present day, when after a politically and socially intense decade, the State has just proposed to Catalonia – soon it will also propose it to Valencia and the Islands – a singular financing, surely conditioned by a great solidarity.

History had already warned Philip II when he visited his father, Emperor Charles of Habsburg, for the last time in the monastery of Yuste, when he advised him that if he wanted to increase the empire, he should locate the capital in Lisbon, because this would mean linking it to the New World; if he wanted to preserve it, he should locate it in Barcelona, in other words, link it to the classical tradition; and if he wanted to lose it, he should locate the capital in Madrid. And indeed, Madrid was the most poorly communicated capital in Europe until the beginning of the 20th century, when, thanks to the development of airlines and the construction of reservoirs, it managed to revitalise that solitude in the middle of the Castilian plateau.

We return to Newton. And how can we move from a centripetal force to a centrifugal force? Well, this will only be possible if there is a tangential acceleration that allows the velocity modulus of the object to vary and, in this way, it will be able to return to its original physical state. So, will technological innovation bring about an acceleration of the economic movement that, by taking advantage of ‘Open Banking’ and ‘Embedded Finance’, will bring about the tangential force that will make it possible to return to our original stage? It is up to us to achieve this!

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Almost a year into Israel’s current offensive on Palestine, which has already killed more than 41,000 people, the ‘Centre Delàs d’Estudis per la Pau’ publishes a new report that focuses on the banks and weapons corporations that are profiting from the ongoing genocide.

The report on ‘La Banca Armada y su corresponsabilidad al genocidio en Gaza’, carried out by the ‘Centre Delàs d’Estudis per la Pau’, analyses 3,606 financial operations that took place from 2014 to 2024, most of them executed in the last five years, between 15 arms companies that have sold their production to Israel and the banks that have financed them.

Since 2008, the Delàs Centre has published over a dozen reports, books and numerous articles denouncing the relationship between banks and arms corporations. In this new publication, it aims to appeal to the responsibility of the financial institutions that are part of the ecosystem of arms sales that the Israeli army uses against the Palestinian territories, systematically perpetrating crimes against humanity.

The shameful stats

This report presents and reviews the main arms exports to Israel over the last 10 years, mainly based on data obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI) and supplemented by other sources. Most of the transactions cover the period from 7 October 2023 to the present.

The study identifies 15 arms manufacturers supplying weapons and munitions to Israel: BAE Systems, Boeing, Day & Zimmerman, Elbit Systems, General Dynamics, Israel Aerospace Industries, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Nammo, Navantia, Oshkosh Corp, Rafael Advanced Defending Systems, Rheinmetall, Rolls-Royce and RTX Corp (formerly Raytheon Technologies).

It also points to 25 international financial institutions that are financing the Palestinian genocide. The investment fund manager Vanguard tops the list with more than 37 billion euros, followed by the investment and financial services corporation State Street (35,200), and the investment fund managers Capital Group (28,800) and BlackRock (27,900), with Bank of America (17,230) closing the top five with US financial institutions.

The complicity of Spanish banks

According to the report, up to 12 Spanish financial institutions, including Santander, BBVA and CaixaBank, but also other state banks such as Ibercaja, Banco Caminos and Banca March, have financed seven of these companies: Boeing, Day & Zimmerman, General Dynamics, Oshkosh Corp, Leonardo, Rheinmetall and MTU Friedrichshafen.

Santander and BBVA are the two banks responsible for most of this financing (95.4% of the total), some 3,600 million euros between the two entities, 2,225 and 1,367 million dollars, respectively. They are followed by CaixaBank (99), Bestinver (59.5), EDM Group (7.95) and ibercaja Group (2.26).

Specifically, BBVA, Santander and CaixaBank financed Boeing and General Dynamics, which exported the GBU-type guided bombs used in the Jabalia massacres of 9 and 31 October, where almost 100 civilians were killed. BBVA and Santander, together with Ibercaja and Banco Caminos, also provided financing to Rheinmetall, the company that sold Israel the 155 mm M109-52 Howitzer self-propelled howitzers used last October in the attacks on the Gaza Port.

On the other hand, the production and maintenance of the Boeing F-15 and Lockheed Martin/Leonardo F-35 aircraft that have been exported to Israel in recent years have been financed by Santander, BBVA and CaixaBank. These planes have been widely used in the bombing campaigns over Gaza, Lebanon and Yemen.

The Delàs Centre points out that eleven of these twelve financial institutions have bought shares in one of the companies supplying weapons to Israel. Moreover, it points out that ‘bearing in mind that the majority of the Spanish population is in solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian people and firmly opposes the genocide in Gaza, the banks that support the Israeli military-industrial complex with their money and that of their clients must assume their share of responsibility and cancel all operations that may be related to the war crimes committed by the Israeli army’.

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