Them [and us]

Newton’s first law states that an object always tends to be either at rest or in motion, rectilinear motion, unless an external force alters its state. Therefore, if a centripetal force acts on this object, it will be trapped by an invisible force called the central force. In this way, the object will see its movement altered, its inertia modified, and it will be difficult for it to return to its original physical state.

The Aragonese economist and historian José Larraz López, a distinguished member of the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, wrote an interesting book on economics in 1943 entitled ‘La época del mercantilismo en Castilla (1500-1700)’. He was a procurator in Franco’s Cortes and Franco’s minister in 1939, just after the end of the civil war – and therefore a man committed to Franco’s dictatorship to the bone – and when referring to the unity of Spain, he argued that the political reality of that time – between the 15th and 18th centuries – had been very different from that of his own time. Consequently, we could not speak of the existence of a single unitary state – Spain – for all those centuries, which would be the case after the arrival of the Bourbons.

The fact is that both Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria, León and Castile – the original core of the kingdom – and the three Basque provinces – Alava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya – plus Extremadura, Andalusia, and Murcia will end up forming part of the same integrated body. In this way, the central part of the Iberian Peninsula – the area stretching from the Cantabrian coast to the Strait of Gibraltar – will end up sharing the same border, and the same Cortes will legislate the territories – the Castilian Cortes – which will use the same currency and all together will follow the same economic and fiscal policy. Pardon, except for the three Basque provinces which, from the 14th century onwards, would be exempt from all Castilian taxes. It is therefore clear that the other peninsular territories – Portugal and the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation – were never part of this Castilian matrix.

Indeed, in the mid-15th century, the Iberian Peninsula was divided into five political blocs of unequal importance: Portugal, the territories of the Crown of Castile, the Kingdom of Navarre, the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation and the Muslim Emirate of Granada. In fact, by the middle of the 15th century, each of these groups of territories would eventually acquire a very distinct personality and become original societies with their own customs, their own legal peculiarities, their own institutions and even their own language.

That a historian of the darkest period of the dictatorship – such as José Larraz López – should serve to combat the colossal misinformation or ignorance wanted by current Spanishism should shame a part of the political class, the media – including the ‘influencers’ hidden behind the networks – who time and again, from their supreme tribunes, have not tired and will never tire of proclaiming the existence of a unitary Spain for more than five hundred years.

The Castilian oligarchy -for too long and although speaking Catalan in private-repeats over and over again the same mistake when they speak of Spain as a political reality since the 15th century, referring to it as ‘the oldest nation in Europe’. If they understood once and for all that from the 15th century to the early 18th century, Castile pursued a policy of zero integration of the Mediterranean – and Portuguese – world, and that this was only possible through the use of force, combined with persistent repression and a constant plundering of economic resources in order to modulate their legitimate aspirations, it would surely help them to understand many issues that happen to us today as a state. More specifically, it would help them to understand that the Spanish project – as it has been set out since the arrival of the Bourbons – is totally unsustainable.

The beginning of the Hispanic divergences

After the Navas de Tolosa, Castile definitively entered the interior of the lower Meseta, which provoked a period of extreme euphoria in view of the possibilities offered by the new territory. But it soon realised that, despite its determination, it was encountering the same problem that León had encountered at the end of the 12th century. It was after the Concordia de Benavent – the agreement on the purchase of the kingdom of León by Castile – that Castile – except the Granada Kingdom, acquired practically the current perimeter.

The lower plateau, with its mountainous and rugged terrain -especially in the areas closest to the Central system-had land that was unsuitable for agriculture -except for the Guadalquivir valley-, with scarce and poor quality pastures, which, added to the strong climatic variability between summer and winter, were too adverse factors to be able to take control quickly. In addition, there were three even more determining factors: the low birth rate of the population in the north, the lack of mobility of inhabitants from the north to the south – despite the promotion of the ‘presuras’ or territorial divisions – and the consequences of applying an excessively repressive policy against the native population – by arguing nonsense – which culminated in the expulsion of the Andalusian Moriscos.

All these factors would have a very negative impact on the Castilian economy because any manufacturing and commercial activity, such as trade with the East or Africa across the Straits of Gibraltar, would be nipped in the bud. In any case, the Monarchy – in order to prolong its expansionary policy – continued to need to increase its regular income, which contributed to a situation of extreme inflation, resulting in a monetary alteration and generating a permanent deficit in its balance of trade.

As a solution, the Monarchy exerted strong fiscal pressure on some sectors of the population – such as the Jews, for example – but above all on the great transhumant herds of the upper plateau, just at the time when both Flanders and northern Italy were becoming the great buyers of Castilian wool. This plains traffic had catapulted Burgos to the forefront of European cities and turned the Cantabrian Sea into an important maritime axis towards Europe, which stimulated the birth of a textile industry. But all this faded away as soon as the interests of the nobility – the owners of the land, based on ancient rights of conquest – prevailed over any private initiative of the plainsmen, which made it impossible for the economy to flourish in the following centuries.

Faced with economic suffocation, the Monarchy – in order to boost the economy – resorted to the credit offered by the Jewish communities settled in the main Hispanic cities. So it was, sooner rather than later, that kings, nobles, military orders, ecclesiastical communities and ‘councils’ – and even individuals or ‘situados’, as they were known at the time – ended up abusing credit, which in the long run became a real internal problem. Faced with the heavy indebtedness of the Castilian public treasury, the Monarchy – as a result of the generalisation of non-payments – began to reform its financial system, although the real trigger was the promulgation of the Edict of Granada – also known as the Decree of the Alhambra – by which the Catholic Monarchs decreed the expulsion of all Jews from the Hispanic territories, which meant obtaining large assets for the Monarchy in the short term.

As for the rest of the peninsular territories – above all the Mediterranean and the Portuguese Atlantic world – they were able to find in the sea a lever for growth that allowed them to continue with their expansionist policies. For example, the Catalan commercial bourgeoisie was able to take advantage of the consequences of the war with France – the famous crusade of Philip Ardid – to boost its manufacturing industry. The creation of the Consulates of the Sea and the extension of old maritime routes – begun in the 10th century – were the mechanisms of penetration that the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation used to satisfy the demand for its products – rags, iron tools, coral, leather, spices and slaves – both in the mainland markets – Lisbon, Donostia, Bilbao and Seville – and in the foreign markets of Sardinia, Sicily, Bruges, Constantinople, Tunisia, and Alexandria.

A territory made up of ‘free people

From the beginning of feudal expansion – at the beginning of the 9th century – the territories of the northwest peninsular were configured under the juridical-administrative formula of ‘dominium’, based on Roman law, which meant that the holder of the land property was a ‘dominus’ or lord. Therefore, the king or the count – the highest figure in the social pyramid – from the beginning became the final owner – directly or indirectly – of all those lands that were expropriated.

It should be borne in mind that no lord would have the slightest interest in owning land, water, herds or mills if there were no peasants capable of organising stable work processes that would lead to the conversion of effort into income. Therefore, with the creation of Extremadura from the 9th century onwards, the Castilian-Leonese expansionist policy was implemented by means of the ‘villa and land’ communities, which would become the key element of political-legal organisation within the ‘new expropriated territories’. In this way, the landscape of the Meseta was articulated on the basis of the foundation of a series of major towns – walled and with representation in the Castilian Cortes – on which depended six or eight unwalled hamlets located around the main town.

For the lords, the real danger lay in the existence – within that vast territory – of free peasant communities that could escape the new jurisdiction. For this reason, they created mechanisms that involved a brutal indebtedness of those communities of ‘villa and land’ through the famous settlement charters or ‘asentamientos’ and the ‘presura’ contracts, so that they would lose all possible mobility, remain attached to the land and, in this way, ensure the return of the debts contracted.

And since the king’s life was so ‘sacrificial’ – it still is today when they indulge in the luxury of elephant hunting – they ended up ceding the land for services rendered to other lords, ecclesiastical bodies or monasteries. Therefore, it depended on who was the final rentier – that is, the owner – whether the land was known as ‘realengas’, if it belonged to the king; if it belonged to an abbot or a bishop; ‘de solariego’, if it belonged to a nobleman or a military order; or de ‘behetría’, if it was the villagers themselves who chose the lord. In the long run, all these types of property would contribute to the formation of the large estates of the region – known as the process of ‘seigniorialisation’ – which, from the 14th century onwards, would lead to the concentration of much power, both economic and territorial, in a very small part of the Castilian population.

Towards a new conception of the stat

At the end of the 15th century, the Castilian-Leonese world would end up ‘expropriating’ some 385,000 km² of land – between the upper and lower plateau – on which nearly four and a half million people would live, including the Granada population. In the rest of the peninsula, the population would be distributed as follows: in the territories of the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation, about nine hundred thousand people would live on about 110,000 km²; about one hundred and twenty thousand people would live on 11,000 km² in Navarre; and in Portugal, one million people would live on 88,000 km².

Castile, although it was the largest territory in the Iberian Peninsula, continued to experience continuous economic and demographic problems, mainly driven by the process of consolidation of ‘seigniorialisation’, to the detriment of the exhausted expansive economy, which had been based on the indiscriminate expropriation of land and the reallocation of property through physical coercion.

Then, during the second half of the 15th century, the Castilian Monarchy began a process of economic transformation through monetary and fiscal reform, which led to a major social imbalance, to the point that it ended up having a direct impact on noble interests. As a result, major disturbances broke out throughout the kingdom and, unable to calm things down, the Monarchy applied a policy of manorial satisfaction by offering more land, more rights and more pensions for life at the expense of the public treasury and financed by a special tax on the population of the towns of the ‘Comuneros0. To top it all off, in the early 16th century, the main Communities of Castile were forced to assume a considerable tax to cover the purchase of the Imperial title – by the Habsburg family – which led to the famous Revolt of the ‘Comuneros’.

Even so, this policy had an insufficient impact in placating the ambitions of the nobility, which brought to light the existence of a much deeper division within the Castilian aristocracy. The existence of two politically antagonistic factions soon became apparent: on the one hand, there were the Pacheco, Villena and Girón families, who were in favour of taking a more active part in the kingdom’s major political decisions and therefore saw the need to weaken the Monarchy in order to control it. On the other hand, there were the Santillanas and Mendozas who understood that the time had come to abstain from power because the Monarchy was the one that had to guarantee the stability of the kingdom to ensure its ‘seigniorial’ privileges… ‘in saecula saeculorum’.

After the Castilian Civil War (1475-1479), the two largest territories of the Iberian Peninsula – the Kingdom of Castile and the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation – created a new political entity known as the Hispanic Monarchy, which was soon joined by Granada (1492), Portugal (1497) and Navarre (1512). That new dynastic state was shaped by the union of only two key elements: the army and foreign policy. For the rest of the elements that would make up the modern state, such as borders, currencies, laws and institutions, they remained completely separate.

Thus, the configuration and distribution of power – agreed by both sides at the Concordia de Segovia – was structured as follows: while Castile was structured according to the sacralised authority of the queen and always above the nobility and the church – thanks to an effective policy of numbing the Cortes – the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation was organised around the Constitution of Observance, which would always oblige the king to govern and make agreements in accordance with the laws of the Principality.

In the long run, Castile would offer less resistance to the Hispanic monarchs, something that would not happen within the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation, which, while respecting all its legal-political realities, would end up limiting the non-agreed initiatives between the different arms – count-king, nobility, clergy and honest citizens – that would represent part of the confederate society. The historian John Elliott in his famous book ‘Imperial Spain (1469-1716)’ very aptly defined it as follows: the Spanish sovereigns (Castilians) were absolute kings in Castile and constitutional monarchs in Aragon (Catalonia).

The unconscious empire

Only chance and the trade winds led the first navigators of the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation to the most populated area of the American continent. From the very beginning of the westward voyages, the first navigators were certain and aware that where they had arrived was not the East Indies, but a completely different territory. Realising this fact, the Castilian Monarchy deployed all its modern legal and administrative machinery to legitimately possess it. Without entrusting itself to anyone and by right of conquest, the Monarchy once again claimed ownership of those territories, ignoring the indigenous population.

The discovery of important deposits of precious metals – between Mexico and Peru – led to the founding or re-founding of important American cities, which acquired a new territorial role in order to ensure a regular flow of wealth to Castile. Thus, acting as nouveau riche, Castile would spend an indecent amount of economic resources to build its concept of civilisation, based on Catholicism. This obsession – sometimes uncontrolled – would lead them to embark on a myriad of conflicts of all kinds, such as theological disputes, family conflicts, commercial affairs or lavish megalomaniac constructions.

However, at the beginning of the 17th century, the American mines began to show signs of depletion, which became more pronounced as the century progressed. Faced with this slowdown, and in order to maintain the same rate of expenditure, the Monarchy resorted to loans from German banks – the Fuggers and the Welsers – and the Genoese banks of the Spinola, Centurione, Balbi, Strata and, above all, Gio Luca Pallavicino families. It would then be forced to raise taxes and exert fiscal pressure on the whole of Hispanic society. We remember the famous ‘Union of Arms’ of the Duke of Olivares. Faced with a generalised avalanche of non-payments, the State entered into a process of successive bankruptcies (1627, 1647, 1652 and 1662), which contributed to projecting a very unfavourable image of Spain in the eyes of the other European chancelleries.

Spain’s history is still stigmatised today by a ‘black legend’ conceived between the 16th and 17th centuries – both by the Lutherans of Wittenberg and the Dutch of Dillenburg – which sought to chip away at its hegemony in the world. Subsequently, in order to control the raw materials of the Castilian and Portuguese colonies, the English would amplify Protestant propaganda as a key element of discrediting the colonial elites, something that would help them to initiate and finance the independence processes of the Spanish colonies throughout the 19th century.

The Bourbon drift

Castile – and later Spain – has always found itself in a dangerous vicious circle, in which the State’s expenditure has been excessive, and it has needed to continually increase taxes to balance its income, which has led – over a prolonged period of time – to an excessive fiscal pressure on the population as a whole.

With the entry of the Bourbons – after a long campaign to discredit the Habsburgs – the economic problems worsened when, through the use of continuous loans, on-lending, negotiations and renegotiations, these only served to satisfy their personal ‘grandeur’, to the detriment of the modernisation of society by the Enlightenment spirit that prevailed throughout Europe.

The Bourbons were always aware that the only way to economically sustain the entire Hispanic kingdom was to annex all the peninsular territories and thus form a new geopolitical hexagon. However, this was not possible because from the end of the 17th century, Portugal was no longer part of the Hispanic Monarchy, although attempts were made to annex it on three occasions during the 19th and 20th centuries. Therefore, efforts could only focus on the territories of the Levant peninsular which, first with the War of Succession and then with the Nueva Planta Decrees, allowed the Bourbons to link productive sectors – master craftsmen and merchants – to the new centralist system. As a result, this loyalty to the Bourbons allowed those who supported the new regime to gain access to large public contracts, which led to their absolute dependence on the new centralist system, which ended up weaving a web of widespread corruption at all levels of public administration.

There is no shortage of examples, such as when at the beginning of the 19th century Queen Maria Cristina – widow of Ferdinand VII – handed over power to the Spanish liberals, who at the same time made a pact with the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie to forge a self-interested political and socio-biological alliance that would materialise with the institution of a protectionist system. In this way, the Catalan mercantile tradition was squandered and the spirit of 1705 was betrayed, because the Bourbon refusal to free trade the Principality with England and the Netherlands – its main trading partners – initiated the whole process that would converge on 11 September 1714.

Nor did the establishment of the ‘democratic regime of “78” improve matters for the interests of the Levant peninsular. In fact, we Catalans, Valencians and Balearic Islanders suffer the consequences on a daily basis when, year after year, we contribute a massive amount of our GDP to the State coffers for the sake of a ‘solidarity-based centrality’ and, let us remember, with the approval of politicians, industrialists, and bankers. And the story continues to the present day, when after a politically and socially intense decade, the State has just proposed to Catalonia – soon it will also propose it to Valencia and the Islands – a singular financing, surely conditioned by a great solidarity.

History had already warned Philip II when he visited his father, Emperor Charles of Habsburg, for the last time in the monastery of Yuste, when he advised him that if he wanted to increase the empire, he should locate the capital in Lisbon, because this would mean linking it to the New World; if he wanted to preserve it, he should locate it in Barcelona, in other words, link it to the classical tradition; and if he wanted to lose it, he should locate the capital in Madrid. And indeed, Madrid was the most poorly communicated capital in Europe until the beginning of the 20th century, when, thanks to the development of airlines and the construction of reservoirs, it managed to revitalise that solitude in the middle of the Castilian plateau.

We return to Newton. And how can we move from a centripetal force to a centrifugal force? Well, this will only be possible if there is a tangential acceleration that allows the velocity modulus of the object to vary and, in this way, it will be able to return to its original physical state. So, will technological innovation bring about an acceleration of the economic movement that, by taking advantage of ‘Open Banking’ and ‘Embedded Finance’, will bring about the tangential force that will make it possible to return to our original stage? It is up to us to achieve this!

11Onze is the community fintech of Catalonia. Open an account by downloading the app El Canut for Android or iOS and join the revolution!

“Economic independence means that you don’t depend on anyone or anything to live”. Plain and simple. That’s how clear our financial director, Oriol Tafanell, is. We follow, step by step, his advice, and we answer how the 11Onze community will reach it.

First, however, we need to ask ourselves why it is so important to empower ourselves. “Economic independence allows you to decide what you want to do in life and this, even though we often separate the heart from the brain, makes you emotionally stronger,” Tafanell says right at the start. With financial independence, we forget the stresses, the nerves, the sleepless nights and the anguish. Economic independence, then, is first built individually, and then we struggle to achieve it collectively. Let’s see it!

Three tips for individual emancipation

1. Make a budget. Our CFO is concise: “The most basic thing is to make a budget, to know what income you get and what expenses you have”, he says. If the income is not enough to pay all the expenses, the most logical thing to do is to reduce the latter. And he gives an example: “If you have made a budget thinking that you will pay a rent of 1,000 euros a month, but then you add clothes, food, supplies, and it is not enough, maybe you have to see if the rent you have is too high. If you get obsessed, or you know you can’t reduce the expense in any way, you have to look at how to get more money.” For Tafanell, it is very important to know how much money we have, how we manage it and, for this reason, he considers an application like the one 11Onze’s clients will have, El Canut, to be essential: “People will have the possibility of seeing where and how their money is, they will learn how to manage it, how to move financially. It’s a tool,” he says.
2. Force yourself to save. Even if you have achieved a stable balance between income and expenses, Tafanell recommends that income should always exceed expenses, for one simple reason: uncertainty. “You have to be able to deal with shocks, and in life they happen all the time: because you lose your job, because your fridge breaks down… Any situation can cause a crisis. Then, what will really make you financially independent is that your income allows you to save,” he says.
3. Detail what you have to spend the money on. Finally, our financial director reminds us that each stage of life has to set savings priorities. “So, when you are young, if you study thanks to your family, it is important to work to save. Later, you live as a couple, you have children, or you build a career path, and savings are used to be able to pay for what’s coming up. And, in the end, when we are old, we have to invest our savings in a good pension plan, in retirement,” Tafanell says. The key, according to him, is to do “a little bit every day, to maintain discipline throughout your life.

The five objectives for collective empowerment

1. Reduce debt. “Today, with the economic situation we have, if you are young, you have to study and work, and save. In cities like Barcelona, paying rent is practically impossible. This must change, it is clear. A universal income? In a country like ours, although we would like it, we have to forget about it,” admits our chief financial officer. And he reminds us that “Spain is a country with a high deficit”. “If collective economic independence is to maintain the expenses and income of a country, we cannot get into debt. And in Spain, indebtedness grows and grows, everything goes to pay interest,” he explains.
2. Solidarity means paying taxes. For that reason, it is essential, according to Tafanell, “to be very supportive”. “That means that no one works under the table and that everyone pays taxes,” he summarizes. On a large scale, it means avoiding tax evasion and tax havens. “It’s unsupportive, and all it makes is sinking the country’s collective economy.” In fact, the more people pay taxes, Tafanell explains, the less taxes we will have to pay.
3. Continue to educate the world. “There is too much capital that does not pay money. This has to stop,” he says, and the comment inevitably leads him to talk about the business culture of Mediterranean countries, which he sums up with the saying: “The law is made, the trap is made”. “It can’t be that the first thing we think about is how to sneak around, how to make the most of the system. Everyone makes a thousand and one tricks,” says our CFO with his gentle demeanor. Picaresque, he says, means that the unemployment rate has reached 25%, as it has during the pandemic, and there is no revolt. For this reason, he considers the reflection and debate that the 11Onze community proposes in La Plaza to be essential. “And from here, to continue educating. We can help, for sure. That is why we have created a financial community”, he says. 
4. Rebuilding the econmic network. Precisely, the community that 11Onze is patiently building is the key to rebuilding a Catalan economic network that, Tafanell confesses, “practically no longer exists”. “In Catalonia we were very proud to be a country of entrepreneurs, but the second and third generations of managers sold all the successful companies to multinationals, who don’t care whether the headquarters are in Catalonia or Mozambique,” laments the financial director. Moreover, instead of investing the money from these sales in innovation and development, it has gone into real estate and speculation. 
5. Defining our community. The last objective for achieving economic independence is, therefore, to define very clearly what our community is. “If it is only the territory of Catalonia, and we do not have to drag the deficit of the whole of Spain along with us, the power we have to build ourselves economically is impressive,” he says. And he concludes: “The independence of Catalonia is a dream, yes, but I believe it is achievable. We have to prepare people for when it is possible. How? Less words. We have to take to the streets”.

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La democràcia representativa és el sistema més estès als països capitalistes de lliure mercat. Com encaixa amb el concepte clàssic de democràcia? Com hauria de funcionar la democràcia directa?

Els partits polítics celebren congressos que la major part de la ciutadania, que no n’és militant, mira amb estranyesa. Allà es decideixen les línies i objectius d’aquell partit polític. A partir d’aleshores, aquells polítics intentaran servir els objectius que s’han marcat, sempre adaptant-se a la situació del moment i intentant, per damunt de tot, salvaguardar el partit.

Això passa amb tots els partits, siguin del color que siguin, i la bunquerització partidista sovint acaba diluint el mandat representatiu inicial d’aquells polítics. Perquè, la idea original de la democràcia actual era aquesta: una democràcia representativa en la qual els electors escullen uns polítics que han de representar els seus ideals (els dels electors). Sobre el paper té sentit, però la realitat és més complexa. Els representants formen en realitat part d’un engranatge ple d’interessos de lobbies i del mateix partit, fet que fa que l’ideal representatiu quedi cada vegada més lluny.

Històricament hi ha hagut altres formes de democràcia. La democràcia directa que s’aplicava a l’antiga Grècia i durant quatre segles a la República de Roma n’és la més coneguda, i permetia a la ciutadania proposar o revocar lleis. Actualment, el més similar a aquest model són els casos de Suïssa, Liechtenstein o alguns estats dels Estats Units com Califòrnia.

És possible, per tant, gestionar la cosa pública d’una altra manera? Es pot millorar o, com deia Churchill, ens hem de conformar amb el menys dolent dels sistemes possibles? Al capítol 9 d’El Diner, repassem el concepte clàssic de democràcia i les principals formes de govern, així com l’evolució històrica del model democràtic. Et convidem a recuperar-lo.

11Onze és la fintech comunitària de Catalunya. Obre un compte descarregant l’app El Canut per Android o iOS. Uneix-te a la revolució!

The economic exuberance of the late 17th century will make the European monarchies believe that the wealth of the world is static and just needs to be shared out. The constant inflow of gold and silver into the economy would allow them to universalise their idea of civilisation, and they would take advantage of the wonder caused in those cultures with ancestral practices and beliefs. Of the 700 million people who will inhabit the world, almost 120 million will live in Europe, given that globalisation – begun two centuries earlier – will provide them with a food variety that will allow them to extend their life expectancy.

Oriol Garcia Farré, historian and 11Onze agent

By the end of the century, Europeans will have empirically verified the whole of the earth, which will enable them to generate cartography based on observation of reality. Gone will be the imaginary geography based on dogmatic superstitions. Thus, an infinite number of descriptions of exotic civilisations would appear in the European imaginary, which would bring about a change in tastes -more orientalised- and would give rise to a progressive critical attitude towards the beliefs that Europeans held about the world. This feeling of cultural universality will be diluted as Europeans understand that the world is also inhabited by a multitude of cultures and civilisations, which are different from the descriptions contained in the Bible.

Therefore, the adoption of critical thinking will entail the encyclopaedic codification of nature through the revolutionary scientific method, which will be based on observation, experimentation and empirical speculation. Physics – written in mathematical language – will describe the shapes and measurements of celestial bodies, using the newly created analytical geometry. And from this moment on, science will become a body of knowledge differentiated from philosophy and religion. All this will lead to a perception of reality that will cause European intellectual elites to question such basic concepts as property, justice, power and, above all, religion.

The questioning of the divinisation of power

Clearly, the Church – both Catholic and Protestant – will have to face a multitude of dissenting voices that will doubt the divine origin of the sacred texts, since the divine authorship of the Holy Scriptures will be questioned. Religion will then become an individual and private matter between man or woman and God. And by virtue of this privatisation, Europeans will progressively free themselves from compulsory dependence on the dogmatic disciplines imposed by the Church since the 10th century.

The fact of questioning the sacred foundation that justified the existence of Christian states would crack the confessional legitimacy of the political authority represented by the monarch. With the awareness of the self – through the rational principle “cogito ergo sum” – modern philosophy was inaugurated, which led enlightened scholars to openly question the divinisation of royal power. 

This innovative rational thinking will provoke a frontal clash between the supporters of absolute power – in the hands of a single person and fiercely defended by all the European monarchies – against the defenders of the natural state of the human being, who will argue that “no man can be subjected to the arbitrary will of another man, nor can he be forced to obey laws that another man would not follow as he would”. This thought will provoke a profound crisis of European consciousness, which will open the way to the invention of liberty and the claim for social equality.

Absolute power and mercantilism

The theorists of monarchical power – such as Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes – justified absolutism as the most perfect form of government and the only one capable of managing the vast accumulation of wealth extracted from the colonies. The high civil service – appointed by the king himself – will develop ever more efficient mechanisms to meticulously organise the state’s finances, since its profits will not only be made by introducing large quantities of gold and silver into the economic system but also by maximising exports and minimising imports with the help of strategic tariffs.

Convinced that the wealth of the world was static because it could only be taken, traded or stolen, absolutist monarchies would persecute any intrusion or private initiative that would destabilise the international trade system, such as the systematic persecution of piracy. On the other hand, the multitude of war conflicts between the different European monarchies – throughout the 17th and 18th centuries – will be seen as a necessary exchange of wealth, territories or people in which everyone will either win or lose and in this way, the economic system will be maintained, which will always have to add up to zero.

The European monarchies – overjoyed by abundance – will completely forget about the lives of their subjects. Marvelling at the situation, they were incapable of implementing social and economic improvements and soon came up against the serious problem of collective poverty within their societies. And in a context of incipient social conflict – such as that of the early 18th century – the economists of the time, Colbert, Mun, Serra or Misselden, defended the application of a low wage policy as the only way to achieve competitiveness in international trade, followed by the perverse argument that “if the population has wages above subsistence level, these will be the cause of the reduction in labour effort”.

The wealth extracted from the colonies will not only be accumulated or transformed into the productive resources that the economy requires but above all it will be used to be exhibited through the arts – architecture, painting and sculpture – the sciences and culture. And all this will lead to a paradox when the main absolutist monarchies – French, Austrian, Russian or Castilian – will be able to live in their lavish palaces, in the most exquisite and refined opulence, regardless of the scarcity of resources on which most of their subjects lived. Even so, this structural dynamic would crumble with the irruption of enlightened rationalism in European thought, which would contribute to the definitive rupture of the status quo of centuries of monarchical excesses. Enlightened despotism attributed to the monarch the mission of bringing economic progress and social welfare to all his subjects, which led to an infinite number of social conflicts. On this point, not all European monarchies tackled the problem of redistributing wealth in the same way.

Two solutions to the same problem

One of the answers would be provided by the Crown of Castile through its economic policies, which would still allow it to enjoy relative international predominance. However, the massive extraction of precious metals from the “New World” – which had allowed it to become obsessed with its particular idea of cultural universalisation – had led to short-sightedness and a lack of adaptability to the changing movements of the economy. Therefore, faced with the challenge of redistributing prosperity among its subjects, it will find itself trapped between a gigantic debt and a lethargic society that will depend mostly on royal decisions and the resources coming from the colonies. All this will reveal the existence of a parasitic social pyramid that will result in a single peasant – constrained by the system of censuses and privileges – being obliged to feed thirty non-producers.

Therefore, the strategy followed by the Crown of Castile – through the king’s ‘valid ones’, the famous Duke of Lerma, the Count-Duke of Olivares or Father Nithard – would be to exert strong fiscal pressure by increasing or creating new taxes on the fragile peasant economies, or on the urban classes by constantly raising prices and lowering wages. This economic programme sought to obtain the maximum resources to continue to support the idea of Empire, given that until then it had allowed them to enjoy a positive balance of trade. In contrast, the nobility and the clergy would be completely exempt from all these tax burdens, as well as allowing them to increase their income. In the end, all this led to a significant impoverishment of Castilian society, with disastrous consequences for the birth rate and the depopulation of large areas of the ‘Meseta’, which would not fully recover until the beginning of the 20th century. And to top it all off, society would be hijacked by the Court of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, which would ensure – through censorship, the creaming of “banned” books and misogynist fundamentalism – that no critical thought that shunned the official line would germinate.

On the other hand, we find the response of the northern European territories – such as the English Crown and the seventeen United Provinces – which will involve firmly introducing Enlightenment ideas into society, politics and economics. While England was to become a parliamentary monarchy through a political process that limited the power of the monarch and the separation of powers, the military union of Utrecht – made up of the seventeen United Provinces – fought energetically until the Peace of Münster against the occupation of the Crown of Castile to become the republic of the United Provinces of the North. Both territories will adopt a new approach to trade that will lead to a mutation of the economic system and will adopt a free market logic without restrictions or state protection. The generation of wealth will no longer be through blood but through the individual’s ability to accumulate capital, which will lead to the emergence of surplus value, the source of the new conflict. And in this new economic paradigm, the State will no longer have a place, given that the basic and irreducible elements that will drive this new mentality will be – both for companies and individuals – under the economic imperative of maximising profits and minimising losses.

Change of the economic paradigm

The cultural universality that had prevailed until then would be replaced by new reasoning based on “if it can be shown that the economic output of all the world’s industrial production must be concentrated in Madagascar or Fiji or that the entire population of black Africa must move to the New World to work on the cotton or sugar cane plantations, there is no economic argument that can stop these initiatives”. And so capitalism will impose ever more extensive globalisation and reach ever more remote regions, which will be more profoundly transformed.

The world will be divided into productive plots according to global criteria such as “it makes no sense to produce bananas in Norway because they are much cheaper to produce in Honduras”. Therefore, when Argentinean landowners will only produce meat or Australian farmers will only be expert wool producers, they will have abandoned their own agricultural production, since it will be more profitable for them to buy grain production for their own consumption abroad. Thus, these transactions will allow them to speculate and get a better economic return on their investments.

And in this sense, both England and Holland were the only exporters of capital and financial services to the American or Asian colonies in order to destabilise the old empires – Castile and Portugal – and thus secure the raw materials for the incipient industrial revolution. The London and Antwerp stock exchanges – founded at the end of the 17th century – would become the commercial capitals of the new economy based on the expectation of speculative dynamism, which would be mainly participated in by the descendants of the Sephardic Jews expelled by the Hispanic Monarchy at the end of the 15th century.

From the beginning, both England and Holland were certain that in order to develop the new economic paradigm, a process of concentration of economic activity by means of the urbanisation of coastal areas had to be set in motion, which enabled them to promote shipbuilding and the development of manufacturing close to the ports. This allowed them to turn their coastlines into economically very dynamic and powerful areas. A similar situation occurred on the Mediterranean peninsular coast, which became one of the territories with economic growth similar to that of the territories of Northern Europe. It was then that Catalonia would acquire territorial cohesion on the basis of an urban system closely intertwined with Barcelona – as a commercial and political centre – while at the same time, the industry would develop for the nearby towns – Sants and Saint Martin de Provençales – and mercantile activity would be reoriented towards the Atlantic and the interior of the peninsula.

According to the annual survey carried out by the OCU, this year’s school year in Catalonia will cost an average of 2,700 euros per pupil, almost 400 euros more than last year. School materials alone could cost more than 500 euros per pupil on average.

On Monday 9 September next week, the school year starts in Catalonia and, despite the recent fall in the CPI, this year’s ‘back-to-school’ will be the most expensive since records began. Spending per pupil will be 13% higher than last year, which was already a record year.

The report drawn up by the Organisation of Consumers and Users (OCU) calculates that Catalan families will spend an average of 2,708 euros per pupil during the school year. This figure places Catalonia as the third most expensive autonomous community, behind Valencia (2,725 euros) and Madrid (3,422 euros).

The level of studies influences the cost, but one of the most determining factors is the school chosen. The average annual cost in a public centre is 1,200 euros per student, while in a subsidised centre it rises to 3,396 euros and in a private centre it can be as much as 7,961 euros.

Averting the red numbers in the family account

Uniforms, textbooks, and other school materials alone can cost more than 500 euros on average per pupil. This is an expense for which the Generalitat gives a 60-euro voucher to help primary and secondary school pupils, designed for families who cannot afford the cost.

The OCU recommends that, before starting to buy, we make a list of all the school supplies we already have at home that can be reused without the need to buy new ones. In other words, buy what is necessary and no more. He also points out that it is not necessary to buy everything at the beginning of the school year, as there are school materials that students do not need until later on.

Likewise, when it comes to books for recommended reading, we always have the option of going to a library. For textbooks, we can consult the free book programmes available in the autonomous communities through the schools or even consider buying second-hand books.

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The economy has been one of the main protagonists in the relationship between Catalonia and Spain. 11Onze agent Oriol Garcia Farré compiles nine of these key moments in our history. They may not be the best known, but they are undoubtedly the ones that have marked a before and after. One after the other, they offer a chronology of encounters and misunderstandings.

“As long as Spain does not understand the Catalan issue,
Spain will be subjected to the same woes of the past”
Américo Castro, 1924 

1479. The construction of a dynastic state

After the Castilian Civil War, the two largest kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula (Castile and Aragon) together created a new political entity known as the Hispanic Monarchy. This dynastic state was formed from the union of just two elements: the army and foreign policy. The other elements that make up a modern state, such as borders, currencies, laws, and institutions, remained completely separate. Thus, with regard to the configuration and distribution of power, it should be borne in mind that, while Castile was organised according to the authority of the queen (Isabella), always above the nobility and the church, the Crown of Aragon was organised around the “Constitució de l’Observança”, which obliged the king (Ferran) to govern and make agreements in accordance with the laws of the Principality. This is the first difference in the system of political and economic organisation between Spain and Catalonia.

1556. The drift of history

With the death of the Castilian queen (Isabella), the peninsular dynastic state was at the point of dissolving. After family vicissitudes, the throne was eventually occupied by the grandson, due to the incapacity of the daughter (Juana) and the death of the son-in-law (Felipe). The dynastic union between the two kingdoms was thus definitively confirmed in the persons of Carlos (the future emperor) and his successors. For years, Emperor Charles sought to consolidate the idea of a universal monarchy that would be polyglot and open to the entire territory of the Habsburg Empire. The Emperor’s policy was aimed at changing the course of European history. It was of no use for him to believe that it was possible for the rights of cities and regions to coexist with the imperial structure, since the idea of the nation-state was gaining ground, largely as a result of the Reformation. Nor did it ever manage to create the necessary complicity between Castilians and Catalans to forge a common country.

1585. The perversity of the system

In the autumn of 1585, King Felipe II of Castile presided over the celebration of the Cortes Generales de la Corona de Aragón in Monzón. Following the tradition established by his father (Carlos), Felipe II thus recognised the duality of power in the peninsular territory formed by the crowns of Castile and Aragon. The parliamentary system always involves tensions – because that’s intrinsic to debating – but it seemed that an agreement would be reached. The problem arose when royal officials tried to blatantly boycott the Cortes‘ resolutions. And it is even more perverse when the Monarchy – unilaterally – decides to manipulate and rewrite the agreements made by the Catalan Cortes to favour its interests. Among the most important alterations, which affected the entire Crown of Aragon, were those relating to the control of trade, the increase in spending by the Royal Court in Catalan territory, and the dilution of the control that the Diputació del General (the Generalitat) could have over the Holy Office (the Inquisition), the repressive arm of the monarchy.

1626. Towards a single centralised unit

In March 1626, Barcelona received the King of Castile, Felipe IV, who had come to the city to swear the Catalan Constitutions. The reason was none other than to unravel the ambitious plan of the king’s minister, the Count-Duke of Olivares. The project, known as the Unión de Armas, called for each kingdom that formed part of Castile – that is, mainly the Crown of Aragon – to contribute a certain amount of money and soldiers. But what the Castilian oligarchies did not realise was that if Felipe IV swore to the Catalan Constitutions, he was automatically granted the title of Count of Barcelona, which obliged him to oversee their resources. The Catalans were, therefore, more interested in having their proposals for new Catalan Constitutions approved, and their grievances addressed, than in engaging in absurd wars. Curiously, two decades later, the northern Catalan territory would be dishonestly torn away from the main body. And it would not be until forty years later that Castile would officially notify the Generalitat of the loss of the northern Catalan territory.

1760. The Catalan mercantile culture of the 18th century

For several decades, a new family of French origin had held the throne of Castile, the Borbones. The open dispute over that ascension had been left behind, to the point that it had had to be settled on the battlefield. Four decades after the Nueva Planta Decree, King Carlos III convened the Cortes Generales in Madrid. In that new political paradigm that emerged from the battlefield, the representatives of the former territories of the Crown of Aragon jointly presented a memorial containing a frontal critique of the Borbonic system in force. To put it very simply, the document, known as the Memorial de greuges, argued that the new state had to safeguard territorial plurality and move away from centralist and unifying structures.

1810. The construction of a new political reality

In the context of a European war, more than 240 deputies from all over the territory arrived in Cadiz convinced that they were going to make history, to write a Constitution. King Carlos IV of Spain had been deposed as an absolutist, after the French occupation of the peninsular territory. The Cortes of Cádiz established that power resided in the citizens as a whole, represented by the Cortes. But Cadiz was also – for the first time – a real opportunity for Catalan politicians to be invited to participate actively in the new Spanish political system that was being created. In that revolutionary context, the Catalan delegation openly defended the proposal to modernise Spain in accordance with the Austrian project that had been liquidated less than a century before. Therefore, economic and social development had to be based on the industrialisation of the territories. But the Treaty of Valençay restored Fernando VII to the throne as an absolute monarch and frustrated all the modern ideas that had emerged from the Cortes de Cádiz and its revolutionary constitution, which had shaken Spain.

1870. History always gives a second chance

That summer of 1870 in Paris, María Isabel Luisa de Borbón y Borbón-Dos Sicilias, Queen of Spain, abdicated. This renunciation of power – like Emperor Carlos – was the consequence of an intense political debate about how Spain’s modernity was to be articulated. The dispute between Carlists and Liberals had been settled on the battlefields for the past three decades. But during the following decades, the impasse would continue. Spain had entered a labyrinth from which it would take a hundred years to emerge. Modernity entailed a profound structural transformation, including the distribution of power. Historiography has approached this period from the perspective of the first crisis of Spanish capitalism. But, in reality, at the root of the economic problem was corruption. 

Politicians, military officers, and nobles speculated in both the railway companies and in construction, to the point that at the end of the decade there was a stock market crash of biblical proportions. The Civil War in the United States caused an increase in the price of raw materials – cotton – the driving force behind the Catalan textile industry, which – due to a lack of foresight on the part of the state – led to the ruin of many businessmen in this sector. And a prolonged period of poor harvests led to a sharp rise in the price of basic foodstuffs, which had a negative effect on the lower classes. In this difficult context, and given that the state was so heavily in debt, two solutions were found: on the one hand, to increase the tax burden on the working classes and, on the other, to embark on a colonial adventure such as the War of the Chincha Islands off the coast of Peru.

1931. The mountains are a good place to think

That spring of 1931, Spain opted to manage power according to a formula that had failed in the past. Corruption had exhausted the system of the Borbonic Restoration and, therefore, a new relationship with power had to be sought. The question then – and still today – was whether Spain could be a federation of nations. It had to be proved! It was in this context that the deputies of the recently created government of the Generalitat of Catalonia, charged with drafting a proposal for a relationship between Catalonia and Spain, took up residence at the Sanctuary of Nuria. Everyone was certain that this was a historic moment. 

The result was a constitutional text that responded to the will of Catalonia and its legitimate right to exercise self-determination. It was proposing a situation of legal and political equality with respect to the other peoples of the State. It was proposing to broaden our outlook. But the state became nervous. A year later, the Spanish Cortes approved a Statute that had nothing to do with the one endorsed months earlier by the people of Catalonia. It rejected the federal formula, reduced the powers of the Generalitat, and established the co-official status of Catalan and Spanish in a bilingual model. Catalonia was reduced to an “autonomous region within the Spanish state”. It was then that sabre-rattling began to be heard in the distance, forcing Spain to return to the battlefield.

2004. Towards a new historical paradigm

With the hangover from the events of the last decade of the last century, everyone believed that Spain had chosen to recognise its diversity. The Catalan language was spoken – even – in the most intimate circles of the Castilian oligarchy. In a climate of economic strength, social stability, and mutual recognition, Catalonia believed it could rethink its relationship with Spain. Was it possible? The scrupulousness of the mission – as in the past – in drawing up a new constitutional framework, such as the new Statute of Catalonia, meant a major effort to find a meeting point where all social strata were represented. How this story continues is known to everyone. 1 October 2017 is the confirmation of the impossibility of dialogue and the need to go back to the beginning of everything: much earlier than the Castilian Civil War of 1479.

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The housing crisis in Spain has not only created a situation of inequality and precariousness that hits the middle and lower classes particularly hard, but may also castrate the country’s economic recovery, becoming a drag on GDP growth.

The cost of housing, both owned and rented, remains sky-high. According to data from the Bank of Spain, during 2023, Spanish households spent on average 39.2% of their income to meet the cost of housing, 15% more than in 2022, and need 7 and a half years of gross salary to purchase a home, the greatest effort recorded since the end of 2011.

The Association of Registrars notes that the price of housing has increased by 2.9% in the second quarter of the year compared to the first, accelerating its rate of increase, which had increased by 0.8% between January and March. The average price has now exceeded 2,000 euros per square metre, standing at 2,057 euros, compared to 1,998 euros in the previous quarter.

In terms of the ability of young people aged between 16 and 29 to emancipate themselves, Spain is still at the bottom of the list of advanced economies. Only 16.3% of young Spaniards are emancipated, far from the European Union average of 31.9%, and they have to spend 92.1% of their salary on housing, as shown in the latest report on the Balance Sheet of the Youth Emancipation Observatory, which regularly monitors young people’s options for accessing the labour market and the housing market.

The weak point of the economic recovery

The housing crisis not only affects the individual, but also has socio-economic repercussions at the collective level. Rising prices cut the disposable income of families, contributing to the expulsion of the middle and lower classes from urban centres to the peripheries, while at the same time reducing aggregate consumption in the economy and limiting growth.

The Economic and Social Council (CES) warned about this a few weeks ago in its Report on the economic and employment situation in Spain: ‘The extreme shortage of social and affordable rental housing in Spain, in addition to being a major social problem that limits the emancipation of young people, the creation of households and the increase in the birth rate, can become a bottleneck that strangles growth’.

President Sánchez’s government recognises the issue and wants to make it a prominent issue of his legislature, ‘in a context of such dynamic and balanced economic growth we have to prevent housing from becoming a bottleneck’, he said in early August. Meanwhile, his counterpart in Catalonia, Salvador Isla, has pledged to make progress in this area in exchange for being invested.

Some economists are concerned that this shortage in housing supply, exacerbated by labour shortages and an expected increase in demand over the next few years, will make the problem even worse, becoming a drag on economic growth.

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Despite having the highest average salary in history, the average Spanish wage is almost 450 euros lower than the EU average and continues to have one of the highest rates of job insecurity in Europe.

Inflation has eaten into wage increases and reduced citizens’ purchasing power to an extent not seen for thirteen years. This economic mess is not unique to Spain, but it is exacerbated by Spain’s low wage levels, an endemic problem that has been dragging on for decades.

Although the latest unprecedented rise in the minimum wage has reduced the gap, both the average gross wage (1,126 euros) and the Spanish minimum wage (1,751 euros) are among the lowest in the European Union, 20.2% lower than its European partners.

Within the Western bloc, with average wages above 2,500 euros per month, Spain is at the bottom, followed by Portugal (1,106 euros) and Greece (1,034 euros). There are wide differences with countries such as France (2,446 euros), Belgium (2,830 euros), the Netherlands (2,883 euros) and Germany (3,303 euros). Spain only does well when compared with the less developed countries of Eastern Europe.

Minimum Wage EU

Average Salary EU

Low productivity and high unemployment

The precariousness of employment for a large part of the population in the face of the business world is an endemic historical evil in Spain. The insecurity created by the fear of unemployment makes workers accept low wages and working conditions that would be unthinkable in other developed countries.

When, after the sanitary crisis, the media spoke of “The Great Resignation“, referring to the fact that in many Western countries many employees were rethinking their priorities, giving up their usual jobs to get better ones, from here, with more than three million unemployed and salaries equivalent to a Western European China, we looked at it as if they were talking about another planet.

The high number of part-time and temporary full-time workers means that many employees do not receive proper training and do not maintain a professional career, which negatively affects productivity. This is exacerbated by the heavy weight of the service sector in the Spanish economy, which has little added value, low wages and is prone to outsourcing labour activity. The composition of our productive fabric has suffered a gradual deterioration in sectors that historically had better salaries.

Added to this is another trend that is prevalent in Catalonia and in Spain, but which is not observed in the developed European bloc: the enormous wage gap between younger and older employees. The low salaries received by the youngest employees, who will have to sustain the economy in the future, jeopardise the economic support of the country and a solidarity-based pension system.

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Els Balcans Occidentals, una regió situada al sud-est d’Europa, s’ha convertit en un objectiu estratègic per a la Xina en termes d’inversions i influència. El gegant asiàtic ha aprofitat el buit deixat per la Unió Europea després d’anys d’infructuoses negociacions sobre el lent procés d’adhesió amb els països de la península.

Durant les dues últimes dècades, la Xina ha tret partit de l’espectacular creixement de la seva economia incrementant la seva influència arreu del món a través del comerç i inversions. Beijing, amb el seu enfocament en vincular altres països a la Iniciativa del Cinturó i Ruta de la Seda, inverteix el seu capital ajudant a aixecar les economies regionals de parts del món oblidades per Occident a canvi de recursos naturals i accés als seus mercats.

Aquesta expansió de llaços comercials s’ha concentrat principalment en el continent africà, impulsant un nou model de desenvolupament econòmic més benevolent que l’alternativa neoliberal dels poders colonials occidentals. Tanmateix, l’ascendent abast global del gegant asiàtic també és palpable al continent europeu, especialment dins del grup de països dels Balcans Occidentals que no formen part de la UE: Albània, Bòsnia i Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedònia del Nord, Montenegro i Sèrbia.

La península dels Balcans Occidentals és una regió rica en recursos naturals i un element cabdal per al desenvolupament del projecte xinès amb la finalitat de facilitar les seves exportacions a Europa. Això no obstant, una gran part d’aquests països tenen unes infraestructures poc desenvolupades i malmeses després d’anys de conflictes militars, inestabilitat política i manca d’inversió. Concretament, les guerres iugoslaves durant la dècada dels 90 i posteriors crisis polítiques van ser la principal causa de la fragmentació del mercat balcànic i de la destrucció i subseqüent abandó de la seva infraestructura.

És per això que hi ha un gran potencial de desenvolupament econòmic en l’antany espai d’influència soviètica, que la Xina ha suplantat mentre la UE es mirava el melic. Aquesta presència cada vegada més evident del gegant asiàtic ha generat algunes reaccions divergents entre els països de la regió, i preocupa especialment als Estats Units i la Unió Europea, que veuen minvat el seu poder de persuasió a l’hora de dictar les aliances geoestratègiques i comercials d’aquests estats.

Un Pla Marshall a l’estil xinès

A partir de la crisi econòmica global del 2008, que també s’abatia sobre els Balcans, la Xina va veure la regió com un lloc ideal per a oferir les seves inversions, préstecs i exportació de productes. Una dècada després, 136 projectes activats per un valor de 32.000 milions d’euros en els sectors energètics, metal·lúrgics, de la mineria, dels transports i infraestructures s’han fet realitat.

Des dels 61 plans d’inversió aprovats per infraestructures crítiques i construcció de fàbriques a Sèrbia fins als 30 projectes actius en el sector de l’energia a Bòsnia i Hercegovina, els estats més pobres del continent europeu rebien amb les mans obertes al país asiàtic. A la vegada que la Xina els feia donacions de material sanitari i vacunes durant la pandèmia mentre es queixaven de la falta de solidaritat de la Unió Europea que els donava l’esquena.

És veritat que atès que molts d’aquests projectes s’implementen en països amb una situació macroeconòmica precària, un limitat accés a finançament i una situació política relativament inestable, no tenen gaires opcions de trobar altres fonts d’inversió. Encara que aquesta situació pot canviar en un futur, el soci asiàtic ha establert les bases d’una cooperació que difícilment s’esvairan quan millori l’estabilitat econòmica-política d’aquests estats.

El cost ocult de les inversions

Els beneficis d’aquesta expansió dels llaços comercials entre els dos continents són evidents. Les inversions xineses han ajudat a millorar la infraestructura i han creat llocs de treball als Balcans, contribuint al desenvolupament econòmic i a la reducció de la pobresa. A més, s’han establert acords de cooperació en àmbits com la cultura, l’educació i la sanitat, fomentant una major interdependència i reforçant les relacions econòmiques i diplomàtiques entre les dues parts.

No obstant això, també hi ha una contrapartida menys positiva que de vegades acompanya a les inversions xineses. Alguns d’aquests projectes han estat subjectes de denúncies i protestes per l’explotació laboral i danys mediambientals facilitats per una legislació laxa i una corrupció governamental endèmica. Un bon exemple d’aquestes males pràctiques va tenir lloc durant la construcció de la planta de pneumàtics de Linglong a Zrenjanin (Sèrbia) amb migrants portats de Vietnam que, segons va denunciar l’Associació Ciutadana Zrenjanin Acció, treballaven i convivien en condicions infrahumanes.

De la mateixa manera, una de les principals crítiques és la manca de transparència dels projectes d’inversió i de les possibles conseqüències de no poder fer front als préstecs multimilionaris que sovint els fan viables. El temps dirà si la Xina seguirà el mateix camí que els poders occidentals amb el Fons Monetari Internacional, generant deutes insostenibles per als països receptors de les seves ‘ajudes’ que comporten una pèrdua de sobirania i la venda dels seus béns i recursos a preus de saldo.

Deixats de la mà de la Unió Europea

Lluny queda la cimera UE-Balcans occidentals Salònica del 21 de juny de 2003, on es promovia el missatge que els Balcans podrien ser membres de la Unió Europea en 10 o 15 anys. Es volia vendre la idea d’una integració europea que més tard va passar a segon pla a causa de la crisi financera del final de la dècada, després per culpa del Brexit i més tard pels resultats electorals als Estats Units i el conflicte a Ucraïna.

Si bé és cert que la UE ha seguit creixent en diversos processos d’adhesió de nous estats membres de l’Europa Central i Occidental, els països dels Balcans Occidentals segueixen a la cua, estancats en negociacions que semblen no avançar 20 anys després de les promeses. Això ha fet perdre credibilitat a la Unió Europea i ha provocat que grans sectors de la població d’aquesta regió, anteriorment molt proeuropeus, avui se sentin traïts per la UE.

Les darreres cimeres europees de caràcter majoritàriament simbòlic i la posada en marxa d’una tímida alternativa europea a la nova Ruta de la Seda, per a ajudar als països en vies de desenvolupament a canvi d’una intensificació dels llaços comercials amb la UE i un refredament de les seves relacions econòmiques amb la Xina i Rússia, és poc probable que canviïn la percepció que tenen els Balcans Occidentals d’una Unió Europea que ja fa anys que ni hi és ni se l’espera.

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La Xina és el major productor d’or del món i fa anys que compra enormes quantitats d’aquest metall preciós. No obstant això, les xifres oficials de les seves reserves d’or continuen sent absurdament baixes. Quina és la quantitat real de les seves reserves d’or? I per què tant secretisme?

Atès que és la segona economia mundial, la República Popular de la Xina disposa d’enormes reserves de divises. Actualment, és el país del món amb les majors reserves d’or i efectiu -si sumem les dues variables- però la xifra real de les seves reserves del metall daurat és un misteri que preocupa a altres actors globals.

A diferència de molts bancs centrals que comuniquen les seves compres d’or a l’FMI cada trimestre, els bancs centrals de la Xina, Rússia i altres països, compren i emmagatzemen or sense declarar-ho com a reserves. Això explicaria per què la Xina posseeix, almenys segons les dades del World Gold Council (WGC), escasses reserves d’or en relació amb el total de reserves divises.

Per exemple, les reserves de divises de la Xina ascendeixen a 3,20 bilions de dòlars, la xifra més alta de tots els països, i el WGC estima que té 2.113,46 tones d’or en reserves, un 3% del total de les seves reserves. Si ho comparem amb els Estats Units, que acumula un 60% de les seves reserves en or -més de 8.000 tones- o amb la mitjana d’altres països que equival a un 40% i un 50% de les seves reserves, veiem que l’estimació de l’or acumulat per part de la Xina està molt per sota de la quantitat que seria lògic esperar.

La distinció entre or monetari i or no monetari

La mateixa Xina ha admès més d’una vegada que les xifres reals de les seves reserves d’or estan molt per sobre de les dades publicades per WGC, tanmateix, s’ha mantingut en silenci des del 2019. Alguns analistes creuen que el gegant asiàtic podria tenir més de dues vegades les reserves d’or dels Estats Units, mentre que la majoria donen per segur que posseeix almenys el doble de la quantitat d’or declarada oficialment.

Però per poder fer una estimació del volum total real de les reserves d’or de la Xina, primer hem de distingir clarament entre l’or monetari (propietat d’un banc central) i l’or no monetari (propietat del sector privat). Això és important saber-ho perquè la Xina només fa públiques les importacions d’or no monetari.

Sigui importat, extret o reciclat, es calcula que el sector privat Xinès ha acumulat fins a 23.000 tones d’or, que sumat a l’or de l’Estat, podria elevar la quantitat total d’or a la Xina fins a més de 30.000 tones. Una quantitat que sembla fàcilment factible tenint en compte que la Xina és un importador net d’or des dels anys ‘90, tot i que produeix un 15% de l’or mundial que, per tant, es queda en el mercat domèstic.

La militarització del dòlar i del sistema financer global

El control que els Estats Units exerceixen sobre el Fons Monetari Internacional (FMI) i el Banc Mundial (BM), així com el seu poder de decidir quins bancs tenen accés a SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), sumat a l’hegemonia del dòlar com a moneda de reserva mundial, els hi confereixen un poder de negociació, intimidació i càstig que és sovint utilitzat per interessos econòmics propis i a costa dels interessos d’altres països.

Aquest és un fet que s’ha evidenciat encara més amb les sancions econòmiques contra Rússia arran de la guerra a Ucraïna i la subseqüent apropiació indeguda de la meitat de les seves reserves de divises i d’or a l’estranger, per intentar soscavar l’estabilitat financera del país. Això, però, no és novetat per una Xina que ha estat objecte de les sancions occidentals durant dècades i que, a més, ha de fer front a una creixent guerra comercial instigada pels EUA, que és emmirallada pels seus estats clientelars a Europa i Oceania.

En aquest context, Pequín veu com Washington continua treballant per agreujar les tensions geopolítiques entre la Xina i Taiwan, cosa que augmenta la possibilitat d’un conflicte bèl·lic indirecte amb els EUA, similar al que està fent front Rússia al continent europeu. En tot cas, és un escenari que reafirma la posició tant de Rússia com de la Xina en el seu intent de desdolarització, fomentant l’ús de les seves divises en el comerç bilateral i incrementant de manera continuada les seves tinences d’or.

Davant d’aquests esdeveniments, no és d’estranyar que la Xina, com fan altres països, es decanti per la discreció a l’hora de donar a conèixer la xifra real de les seves reserves. De la mateixa manera, no es pot descartar que aquesta acumulació “furtiva” d’or estigui relacionada amb el llançament d’una moneda digital recolzada pel metall daurat. Una maniobra estratègica que desestabilitzaria el dòlar i posaria en perill la seva hegemonia, al mateix temps que fomentaria la confiança cap a l’associació política i econòmica dels BRICS.

Si vols descobrir la millor opció per protegir els teus estalvis, entra a Preciosos 11Onze. T’ajudarem a comprar al millor preu el valor refugi per excel·lència: l’or físic.